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Preface
Inflation targeting has become an important policy of central banks during the
most recent two decades. An increasing number of monetary institutions in
high-income countries have adopted an inflation targeting framework or central
elements of inflation targeting policies (Roger, 2009). At the same time, the
period from the early-nineties onwards has generally been marked by low and
stable inflation rates. Since price stability is the main focus of policy makers, it
is important to know how people form their expectations about future inflation
and how uncertainty surrounding inflation evolves. The present thesis addresses
both topics. Whereas the first two chapters are devoted to the measurement and
the international linkages of inflation uncertainty, the third chapter of this thesis
analyzes the process of inflation expectations formation by means of international
survey data.
Increased inflation uncertainty is related to economic cost that goes beyond
the cost of inflation. For example, uncertainty about future inflation distorts
the allocation of long-term savings and investment. Likewise, nominal contracts
involving, for instance, wages and financial assets become riskier (Bernanke and
Mishkin, 1997). Moreover, higher inflation uncertainty is associated with higher
inflation (Friedman, 1977; Ball, 1992; Cukierman and Meltzer, 1986). This link
has recently gained renewed relevance in light of the Great Recession of 2008-
2009, which has caused debt-to-GDP ratios to rise drastically in high-income
countries. Central bankers are now confronted with the call for a temporary
increase of their inflation target to mitigate the debt burden (Aizenman and
Marion, 2011). They might also encounter difficulties in achieving the inflation
target since increasing fiscal pressure entails the risk of higher inflation expecta-
tions (Davig et al., 2011). Overall, the positive link between inflation uncertainty
and inflation increases the cost of high inflation and complicates the anchoring
of low inflation expectations. Understanding the evolution and international
1
linkages of inflation uncertainty is therefore crucial if we want to maintain the
benefits of low and stable inflation rates.
Chapter 1 deals with the measurement problem of unobserved inflation un-
certainty.1 It is motivated by the fact that any individual measure of inflation
uncertainty relies on specific assumptions which are most likely not fulfilled com-
pletely. In order to reduce idiosyncratic measurement error, we propose using
joint information of different measures. To this end, we rely on the most com-
monly used measures of inflation uncertainty. These include survey disagreement
and realized forecast error variance derived from a panel of professional forecast-
ers as well as model-based approaches such as conditional forecast error variance
and stochastic volatility. In addition, we present an approach which relies on a
large cross-section of forecast models.
Based on a principal components analysis, we combine the different measures
to obtain an indicator of inflation uncertainty. We show that the first princi-
pal component provides an adequate indicator since it condenses the essential
information in all measures and overcomes the idiosyncratic measurement error
problem. Notably, each individual measure contributes to the indicator with a
similar weight. The common component thus remains virtually unaffected if one
of the measures is excluded. Furthermore, analyzing the part which is not cap-
tured by the first common component sheds light on to which extent individual
measures may deliver a divergent signal. In particular, we find that some caution
is warranted with disagreement measures, that is, the cross-sectional dispersion
of point forecasts derived from survey data or from a variety of forecast models.
Although disagreement measures co-move with the other uncertainty measures
and are to a large extent reflected in the common component, our results also
suggest that using only one individual disagreement measure may be misleading
particularly during turbulent times.
The construction of an indicator of inflation uncertainty finally allows for
the testing of its link with inflation without relying on assumptions specific to
individual measures. We find support for the Friedman-Ball hypothesis that
higher inflation is followed by higher uncertainty. By contrast, using the indi-
vidual measures provides contradictory results with respect to the direction of
Granger causality. We also document that, after an inflationary shock, uncer-
1This chapter is based on Grimme et al. (2011), which is available as Ifo Working Paper
No. 111.
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tainty decreases in the first two months. This effect seems to stem from the
energy component in CPI inflation. Eventually, uncertainty rises because the
long-term effects of these energy price increases appear to be harder to predict;
this dynamic response is also in line with the Friedman-Ball claim.
Chapter 2 investigates the international linkages of inflation uncertainty in the
G7.2 A large amount of empirical literature analyzes the international connect-
edness of first moment variables such as GDP growth and inflation.3 However,
little is known about the extent to which inflation uncertainty is synchronized
across countries. Against that background, the contribution of this chapter is
twofold. First, it analyzes the degree and sources of synchronization of interna-
tional inflation uncertainty. Thereby, common shocks and spillover effects from
one country to another are considered as possible explanations for synchroniza-
tion. Second, we investigate the origins of changes in the dynamics of national
inflation uncertainty. Both questions are tackled by means of a Factor-Structural
Vector Autoregression (FSVAR) model which decomposes the total volatility of
inflation uncertainty of one country into the contributions of international shocks,
spillover effects, and own shocks.
Covering a long time span from 1960 to 2012, we document a high degree of
co-movement of G7 inflation uncertainty at business cycle frequencies. Moreover,
the degree of synchronization has increased during the most recent two decades.
Estimation of an FSVAR model provides evidence of one common international
shock that drives national inflation uncertainty into the same direction within the
G7 countries. This common shock is in turn found to be related to international
commodity price uncertainty. By contrast, shocks originating in the US have an
impact on a subset of countries only.
Time-varying estimations suggest that the volatility of inflation uncertainty
has decreased over time, paralleling the process of “Inflation Stabilization”. In
order to shed light on the sources of this increased stability, we analyze whether
the size of shocks impinging on inflation uncertainty has declined (“good luck”)
or whether structural changes in the economy and improved (monetary) policy
have altered the propagation of these shocks (“good policy”). The main channel
for lower volatility of inflation uncertainty seems to be domestic shocks that
2This chapter is based on Henzel and Wieland (2013), which is available as CESifo Working
Paper No. 4194.
3See, for instance, Stock and Watson (2005), Kose et al. (2008), Ciccarelli and Mojon (2010),
Mumtaz and Surico (2012), and Bataa et al. (2013a).
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translate less extensively into the individual economies. This finding supports the
hypothesis of “good policy”. Finally, we document that the relative importance
of international shocks has increased, which explains a higher connectedness of
inflation uncertainty among the G7. Overall, considerable changes in the conduct
of monetary policy are likely an important source of the reduction in inflation
uncertainty and its associated volatility. Since our results in Chapter 2 attribute
an important role to policy changes, they also suggest that the trend of generally
low and stable inflation uncertainty during the most recent two decades might
be reversed if central bankers are less credibly committed to price stability.
The final part of this thesis focuses on the process of inflation expectations
formation by addressing the question of whether forecasters have imperfect in-
formation. The resulting informational rigidities provide an explanation for the
real effects of monetary policy via a short-run Phillips curve (Mankiw and Reis,
2010). Imperfect information can arise either due to delayed (“sticky”) informa-
tion (Mankiw and Reis, 2002) or partial (“noisy”) information (Sims, 2003). In
macroeconomic theory, agents with imperfect information challenge implications
derived from a world of full-information rational expectations. In the context
of inflation targeting, for instance, Ball et al. (2005) show that it is optimal to
target the price level rather than the inflation rate under sticky information.
In Chapter 3, we assess the degree of information rigidity in inflation fore-
casts for high-income countries provided by the CESifo World Economic Survey
(WES). Thereby, we follow an approach by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010),
which is directly related to models of imperfect information. In contrast to pre-
vious tests of forecast rationality, it not only allows testing for the presence of
informational rigidities but also provides the chance to determine the economic
significance and mechanisms behind departures from full-information rational
expectations. In addition, we address the more recent question of whether infor-
mation updating is state-dependent. An important merit of our cross-country
panel dataset is that it explicitly allows us to test for state-dependence in in-
flation expectations. Since WES forecasters evaluate the importance of a given
choice of potential economic problems, we are able to investigate whether dif-
ferent “states” concerning the importance assigned to the economic problem
“inflation” influence the formation of inflation expectations.
Applying the approach by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010), we find evi-
dence of informational rigidities in inflation forecasts. On average, WES experts
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update their information set every three to four months. However, the degree of
information rigidity crucially depends on the forecast horizon. We also document
state-dependence in the process of forecasting inflation. When the majority of
WES experts assesses the economic problem “inflation” as being highly impor-
tant, information updating speeds up. That is, forecasters are more attentive
when inflation concerns are prevailing. This conclusion is robust when consid-
ering the level of expected and past inflation. Whenever the value of expected
trend inflation or past quarterly inflation is above a critical threshold, forecasters
are on average more attentive.
For economic modeling, two implications arise from the empirical findings in
Chapter 3. A degree of information rigidity which varies across forecast hori-
zons is consistent with noisy-information models (Lucas, 1972; Woodford, 2001;
Sims, 2003) in contrast to the constant updating frequency implied by sticky-
information models. Moreover, we provide evidence that the degree of infor-
mation rigidity varies with the importance attached to the forecasting variable
inflation. This finding suggests a state-dependent rule of information updating,
as recently advocated by Gorodnichenko (2008) and Woodford (2009).
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Chapter 1
Inflation uncertainty revisited: A
proposal for robust measurement
1.1 Introduction
In the follow-up of the seminal speech of Friedman (1977), a still ongoing debate
has originated concerning the link between inflation and inflation uncertainty
(Ball, 1992; Cukierman and Meltzer, 1986). Empirical testing of the causes
and consequences of increased inflation uncertainty necessitates a valid measure.
Given that inflation uncertainty is an unobserved variable, many different mea-
sures have been proposed in literature. While some studies rely on survey-based
measures, others depend on volatility derived from time series models, or use
realized forecast errors. Each measure is derived from different assumptions
which are most likely not fulfilled completely. This calls into question whether
an individual measure delivers a reliable signal at any time. That is, any indi-
vidual measure most likely suffers from idiosyncratic measurement error. Hence,
empirical results concerning the relationship between inflation uncertainty and
inflation depend crucially on the choice of the uncertainty measure.1
In this study, we propose an approach to mitigate the idiosyncratic measure-
ment error problem. To this end, we rely on the most commonly used measures
of inflation uncertainty. These include survey disagreement derived from a panel
of forecasters, realized forecast error variance, and model-based approaches such
1Mixed results with respect to the direction of causality are obtained inter alia by Grier
and Perry (1998, 2000), Grier et al. (2004), and Berument and Dincer (2005). See also Davis
and Kanago (2000) and Fountas and Karanasos (2007) and the papers cited therein.
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as GARCH and stochastic volatility. Moreover, we present an approach which
is based on a variety of forecast models. We use these measures to construct an
indicator of inflation uncertainty that condenses the information contained in all
measures and overcomes the idiosyncratic measurement error problem.
We demonstrate that all measures are driven by a common component, which
we interpret as an indicator for inflation uncertainty. Notably, each individual
measure contributes to the indicator with a similar weight. The common com-
ponent thus remains virtually unaffected when we discard one of the measures.
Moreover, we document that individual measures have the tendency to drift
apart when uncertainty rises. That is, the measurement error problem seems to
be larger during “uncertain times”. Such a finding emphasizes the benefits of
the indicator approach.
Furthermore, the indicator approach helps examining to which extent individ-
ual measures may deliver a misleading signal since it enables us to analyze the
part of the dynamics which is not captured by the common component. In partic-
ular, we discuss whether disagreement is a good proxy for uncertainty.2 For this
purpose, we analyze disagreement in survey forecasts and disagreement derived
from a variety of forecast models. It appears that both disagreement measures
co-move with the other uncertainty measures and are to a large extent reflected
in the common component. However, some caution is warranted because our
results also suggest that using only one individual disagreement measure may be
misleading particularly during turbulent times.
In a further step, we take advantage of our approach and study the relation-
ship between inflation and inflation uncertainty. This topic has recently regained
relevance because several economists call for a temporary increase of central
banks’ inflation target to mitigate the problem of debt overhang and to fight un-
employment.3 Against this background, the Friedman-Ball hypothesis suggests
that high inflation rates may lead to increased inflation uncertainty which brings
2The relation between disagreement and uncertainty is the subject of an ongoing debate.
Bomberger and Frazer (1981), Bomberger (1996, 1999) and Giordani and So¨derlind (2003) find
supportive results, yet other studies report only a weak relationship or reject disagreement as
a proxy (Zarnowitz and Lambros, 1987; Lahiri et al., 1988; Rich and Butler, 1998; Do¨pke and
Fritsche, 2006; Rich and Tracy, 2010). Lahiri and Sheng (2010b) argue that disagreement is a
reliable proxy for overall uncertainty if the forecast environment is stable.
3See, for instance, the IMF Staff Position Note by Olivier Blanchard et al. (SPN/10/03),
the comment by Ken Rogoff in the Financial Times on Aug 8, 2011, the address by Charles
L. Evans at the Outlook Luncheon on Dec 5, 2011, and the comment by Paul Krugman in the
NY Times on April 6, 2012.
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about economic cost (see, for instance, Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997). Our re-
sults are in favor of the Friedman-Ball hypothesis. We also document that, after
an inflationary shock, uncertainty decreases during the first two months. Such a
behavior appears to be traceable to the energy component in the CPI since we
do not observe a decrease following a shock to core inflation. After a few months,
uncertainty increases swiftly for all inflation-related shocks.
A few studies compare different approaches to measure inflation uncertainty.
For instance, Batchelor and Dua (1993, 1996) contrast inflation uncertainty ob-
tained from subjective probability distributions from the US Survey of Profes-
sional Forecasters (SPF) with different model-based measures. They find no
significant correlation between both categories. Taking uncertainty measures de-
rived from the SPF as a benchmark, Giordani and So¨derlind (2003) document
that model-based measures in general have problems in timely capturing regime
changes. Nonetheless, the standard deviation of a VAR estimated on a rolling
window tracks the time profile of SPF uncertainty quite well. Chua et al. (2011)
have recently identified a particular GARCH model that matches the SPF mea-
sure closest.
All of the above studies take subjective densities of the SPF as the obser-
vational equivalent of inflation uncertainty. Although SPF is conducted on a
quarterly frequency, a time path for subjective uncertainty relating to forecasts
with a constant forecast horizon is available only on an annual basis. However,
uncertainty may emerge rather quickly. Against this background, recent studies
analyze the effects of uncertainty at a monthly frequency (Bloom, 2009; Knotek
and Khan, 2011; Bachmann et al., 2013). To address this issue, our measure
of inflation uncertainty is derived on a monthly basis, yet we document that
our uncertainty indicator produces a time profile which is similar to yearly SPF
uncertainty.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 1.2, we in-
troduce survey-based measures as well as model-based measures. Moreover, we
present a “forecast-based” approach which relies on multiple forecast models.
The relation between the different measures is analyzed in section 1.3. In section
1.4, we investigate the link between inflation and inflation uncertainty. Section
1.5 concludes.
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1.2 Individual measures of inflation uncertainty
1.2.1 Survey-based measures
First, we derive uncertainty measures from survey data. We use individual fore-
casts for CPI inflation from professional forecasters conducted by Consensus Eco-
nomics (CE). CE reports expected consumer-price inflation for the current and
next calendar year. However, since the forecast horizon varies for each month, the
cross-sectional dispersion of forecasts is strongly seasonal and converges towards
zero at the end of each year (Lahiri and Sheng, 2010a). To obtain twelve-months-
ahead inflation forecasts, we follow Dovern et al. (2012) and calculate a weighted
moving average of the annual forecasts. For each month m, the fixed horizon
forecast is obtained by weighting the two available point estimates according to
their respective share in the forecast horizon; i.e., 12−m+1
12
for the current year’s
forecast and m−1
12
for the next year’s forecast. The sample period covers the pe-
riod 1990:M1 to 2009:M12. The average number of fixed horizon forecasts ranges
between 16 and 32 per period, with a mean value of 25 observations.
The CE survey is advantageous because it polls professional forecasters who
should be well informed about the current state of the economy. Moreover,
individual data is provided and the names of the forecasters are given alongside
the numbers. Hence, there is a strong incentive to make a well-founded prediction
in order not to damage the forecaster’s reputation. Against this background,
Dovern and Weisser (2011) find that individual forecasts of US inflation are
largely unbiased. In addition, CE data has the advantage that it runs on a
monthly frequency. As uncertainty may move abruptly, many of the effects we
want to measure would be harder to identify in low frequency data.
Among others, Bomberger and Frazer (1981), Cukierman and Wachtel (1982),
and Batchelor and Dua (1993, 1996) suggest using the root mean squared error
(rmses) as a measure of uncertainty. It is calculated by averaging the individual
squared forecast errors in each period t:
rmsest =
√√√√ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(
πt+12 − πei,t
)2
, (1.1)
where πt+12 denotes realized twelve-months-ahead CPI inflation and π
e
i,t is the
individual point forecast from CE made at time t. As far as the timing is con-
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cerned, we follow Batchelor and Dua (1993, 1996) such that a forecast error
realized at time t+12 represents uncertainty at time t. This implies that rmses
is an ex-post measure (see also Hartmann and Herwartz, 2013).
Bomberger and Frazer (1981), Bomberger (1996, 1999), and Giordani and
So¨derlind (2003) propose the cross-sectional dispersion of point forecasts (dis-
agreement) as a measure of uncertainty. Instead of using the cross-sectional
standard deviation of forecasts, we follow Mankiw et al. (2004) and rely on the
interquartile range (iqrs) since it is more robust to outliers. iqrs is defined as
the difference between the 75th and the 25th percentiles.4
Mankiw et al. (2004) point out that the distribution of forecasts may become
multimodal if model uncertainty is high. This is the case, for instance, around
structural breaks. As dispersion neglects the form of the distribution, Rich and
Tracy (2010), among others, suggest using a histogram-based entropy (ents)
which is computed as:
entst = −
( n∑
k=1
p(k)t[ln(p(k)t)]
)
, (1.2)
where p(k) denotes the relative frequency of individual forecasts falling in a
certain interval k. For a given number of bins and a constant bin width, the
histogram-based entropy is maximized if the forecasts are distributed equally
among all bins. The entropy provides additional information beyond iqrs. Given
the cross-sectional standard deviation of forecasts, the entropy changes with the
shape of the histogram of forecasts. In particular, the normal distribution ex-
hibits a higher entropy than any other distribution of the same variance (Vasicek,
1976).
1.2.2 Forecast-based measures
As a complement to the survey-based measures, we propose a forecast-based
approach which relies on multiple forecast models. To simplify the analysis, we
use VAR models, which are a popular forecast device because of their ability to
4We also computed the standard deviation and the quasi-standard deviation of forecasts
(Giordani and So¨derlind, 2003). The quasi-standard deviation is defined as half the difference
between the 84th and 16th percentiles. With normally distributed data, this measure equals
the standard deviation. The correlation coefficient of these alternative dispersion measures
and iqrs amounts to 0.86 and 0.90, respectively.
10
generate multi-step predictions. A VAR model is also employed by Giordani and
So¨derlind (2003). To obtain a time-varying uncertainty measure, they recursively
estimate a single VAR model and calculate a standard deviation of the forecast
error of inflation for each period. Chua et al. (2011) follow this idea by deriving
error bands from the recursive bootstrapped VAR approach proposed by Peng
and Yang (2008). However, this approach comes at the cost of being conditional
on a specific forecast model which is assumed to provide the correct description
of the data. Moreover, the model is assumed to be the same for all forecasters.
Hence, model uncertainty is virtually absent and forecaster diversity is neglected.
Finally, uncertainty is derived from VAR residuals which are assumed to be
homoskedastic. In effect, this is not consistent with the notion that uncertainty
changes systematically over time. To overcome these possible drawbacks, we do
not use VAR residuals but point forecasts of a variety of VAR models.
To obtain multiple forecast models, we select a number of activity variables
proposed by Stock and Watson (1999) to forecast US inflation. The authors
identify different sub-groups of variables. To keep the analysis tractable, we
choose one representative from each of these sub-groups. We end up with 15
variables, which are described in table 1.A.1 in the appendix. To derive twelve-
months-ahead forecasts for inflation, we build a number of different VAR models.
Each VAR model is limited in size to avoid over-fitting problems. It comprises
the target variable and up to four additional activity variables. Finally, we con-
struct all VAR models that fulfill this criterion; i.e., we consider all possibilities
to choose up to four variables out of the 15 activity variables. The lag length
of each VAR model is determined by BIC, and we end up with a total number
of 1.941 different inflation forecasts for each month. The estimation is based
on a rolling window covering 20 years of data.5 That is, the first sample com-
prises observations beginning in 1970:M1 and ending in 1990:M1. Subsequently,
we derive one-year-ahead forecasts for inflation. We iterate through time until
2009:M12. Note that the estimation period contains the disinflation period dur-
ing the 1980s. Hence, inflation enters the VAR model in first differences (Stock
and Watson, 1999, 2007). Calculating RMSE as defined in equation (1.1) yields
a forecast-based measure of inflation uncertainty (rmsef ). Forecast-based dis-
agreement (iqrf ) is given by the dispersion among the point forecasts measured
5Giordani and So¨derlind (2003) advocate the use of a “windowed” VAR – in opposition to
a recursive VAR – where changes in the inflation process are quickly reflected in the parameter
estimates.
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by the interquartile range. According to equation (1.2), we also calculate an
entropy-based measure (entf ).6
1.2.3 Model-based measures
1.2.3.1 Conditional forecast error variance
ARCH models of many different shapes have been extensively used to model
inflation uncertainty in the US.7 A number of studies highlight the presence
of structural breaks in the inflation process.8 To account for such events like
changes in the monetary regime or the level of steady-state inflation, we follow
these studies and opt for a GARCH model with time-varying parameters. The
model is given by a signal equation (1.3), a state equation (1.4) and equation
(1.5) describing how conditional error variance evolves.
πt = [1 πt−1 πt−2] αt + et et ∼ N(0, ht) (1.3)
αt+1 = αt + ηt ηt ∼ N(0, Q) (1.4)
ht = d+ φe
2
t−1 + γht−1 (1.5)
Here, αt is a vector of time-varying coefficients which follow a random walk.
We model inflation as an AR(2) process which meets the needs to reproduce
the cyclical behavior. ht describes conditional error variance which emerges
from a GARCH(1,1) process. Q is a homoskedastic covariance matrix of shocks
ηt. The estimation is based on a rolling window covering 20 years of monthly
data to replicate a forecast situation. In accordance with the forecast-based
measures introduced in the previous section, the first estimation window starts
in 1970:M1 and ends in 1990:M1. The Kalman filter provides an estimate for
the variance of the forecast error in the last period. Note that this variance
combines model uncertainty emerging from time-variation of the coefficients and
uncertainty emerging from the shock process ηt (see Evans, 1991; Caporale
et al., 2012, for a detailed explanation). We successively iterate through time
6To see whether our results are affected by data revisions, we recalculate the three forecast-
based measures using real-time data. For the purpose of our analysis, we find that revisions of
the target variable CPI inflation are negligible (see appendix 1.A.2).
7See, for instance, Engle (1983), Cosimano and Jansen (1988), Brunner and Hess (1993),
Grier and Perry (1996), Grier and Perry (2000), Elder (2004), Grier et al. (2004) and Chang
and He (2010).
8See, for instance, Evans (1991), Evans and Wachtel (1993), Bhar and Hamori (2004),
Berument et al. (2005), Caporale and Kontonikas (2009), and Caporale et al. (2012).
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until 2009:M12 and obtain an estimate for the variance of the forecast error at
each point in time which obtains the label garch.
1.2.3.2 Stochastic volatility
Stochastic volatility models are used in financial econometrics to model error
variance as a latent stochastic process (see, among others, Harvey et al., 1994;
Kim et al., 1998). Moreover, a stochastic volatility model is proposed as a forecast
model for US inflation by Stock and Watson (2007). The variance of first moment
shocks is assumed to be driven by an exogenous stochastic process. This is in
contrast to ARCH models where error variance is fully described by its own
past. We follow Dovern et al. (2012) and employ the model to measure inflation
uncertainty. The state-space representation is given by equations (1.6) to (1.10).
πt = µt + ηt ηt ∼ N(0, σ
2
η,t) (1.6)
µt+1 = µt + ǫt ǫt ∼ N(0, σ
2
ǫ,t) (1.7)
log σ2η,t+1 = log σ
2
η,t + ν1,t (1.8)
log σ2ǫ,t+1 = log σ
2
ǫ,t + ν2,t (1.9)(
ν1,t
ν2,t
)
∼ N(0, γI2) (1.10)
In the measurement equation (1.6), ηt is a short-term shock with variance σ
2
η,t.
Moreover, the permanent component of inflation µt follows a random walk which
is driven by a (level) shock ǫt with variance σ
2
ǫ,t. The model is estimated with
the Gibbs sampler. As in the case of garch, we use a rolling window covering
20 years of data. Hence, we only use information known to the researcher at
the time the estimate is provided. Finally, we follow the arguments of Ball and
Cecchetti (1990) and use the square root of the variance of permanent shocks
σ2ǫ,t as the measure of inflation uncertainty. Subsequently, it is denoted by ucsv.
1.3 Characteristics of uncertainty measures
1.3.1 Descriptive analysis
All measures presented in section 1.2 require a number of assumptions to work
as good proxies for uncertainty. Most likely, these assumptions are not fulfilled
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completely. For instance, deriving valid measures from survey-based approaches
assumes that the survey is conducted such that bias and measurement error
is small. Moreover, disagreement and entropy are valid proxies only if there
is a positive correlation between the dispersion of forecasts of respondents and
uncertainty of the participants. However, it might be the case that individual
forecasters are highly uncertain and, therefore, reluctant to deviate from the
other forecasters. rmse is an ex-post measure that captures realized forecast
error variance, and we assume that this differs from the subjective uncertainty
of the forecaster only by a random error. Measures inferred from the forecast-
based approach work as indicators for uncertainty if linear time series models
are a good approximation of the model used by individual forecasters. Finally,
model-based measures are conditional on a specific forecast model. Moreover,
this particular model is assumed to be the same for all forecasters, that is, there
is no disagreement.9 In addition, garch provides the conditional variance which
is driven by forecast errors from previous periods. Hence, each measure proposed
in the literature is probably subject to idiosyncratic measurement error. Thus, it
should be beneficial to base the analysis on information contained in all measures
jointly.
We generate the eight individual uncertainty measures introduced in section
1.2: three survey-based measures (iqrs, ents, rmses), three forecast-based mea-
sures (iqrf , entf , rmsef ), and two model-based measures (garch, ucsv). The
individual measures are depicted in figure 1.1. All eight measures exhibit a sim-
ilar pattern, particularly during the recent economic crisis. Nevertheless, there
are also periods when some of the measures diverge.
In the following, we present some descriptive statistics to characterize the indi-
vidual measures. Figure 1.2 displays the autocorrelation of the eight uncertainty
measures on the main diagonal. It shows that the autocorrelation is positive
and significant at the 5% level for each measure. The lowest degree of auto-
correlation is found for survey disagreement whereas the most sluggish measure
is ucsv. In general, inflation uncertainty seems to be a persistent phenomenon.
Cross-correlations are given on the off-diagonal elements of figure 1.2. We find
that cross-correlations are high and significantly positive among all series and
9According to Lahiri and Sheng (2010b), overall forecast uncertainty is the sum of the
variance of future aggregate shocks and the variance of idiosyncratic shocks. Model-based
measures capture only the uncertainty common to all forecasters and neglect forecaster-specific
shocks which are responsible for the disagreement among different forecasters.
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Figure 1.1: Survey-based (iqrs, ents, rmses), forecast-based (iqrf , entf , rmsef ),
and model-based (garch, ucsv) measures of inflation uncertainty
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throughout all leads and lags. We take this as a first indication that all measures
contain a common component. Also note that rmses and rmsef tend to lead
the other measures.
Figure 1.2: Cross-correlations of uncertainty measures
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Note: The bars represent cross-correlations corr(yi,t, yj,t+k) for each pair of variables,
where yi,t denotes the row i variable and yj,t+k is given in the column j. k varies between
−12 and +12. The 5% significance level is indicated by the horizontal line.
The extent of co-movement over time is revealed in figure 1.3. Here, we depict
the evolution of the cross-sectional standard deviation between all measures at
each point in time (solid line). We observe that the standard deviation fluctuates
around a constant value during the first part of the sample, yet the measures
start to diverge towards the end of the sample. The co-movement between all
eight measures further decreases during the recent crisis.10 Figure 1.3 also de-
picts the cross-sectional mean of all eight measures, which is strongly correlated
with the cross-sectional standard deviation; the correlation coefficient amounts
to 0.68. Thus, during more turbulent times, individual measures have the ten-
dency to drift apart and measuring uncertainty becomes more challenging. It
appears that a method attenuating the idiosyncratic measurement error prob-
lem is particularly beneficial in times of high uncertainty.
10In appendix 1.A.3, we validate that the increase of this cross-sectional standard deviation
is not traceable to an individual measure only.
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Figure 1.3: Dispersion of uncertainty measures
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Note: Individual uncertainty measures have been standardized before calculating the cross-
sectional standard deviation.
1.3.2 Common characteristics
To eliminate the idiosyncratic components from the data, we can exploit the
commonalities among individual measures documented in the previous section.
That is, we use the cross-sectional dimension of the data to alleviate the idiosyn-
cratic measurement error problem. For this purpose, we conduct a Principal
Component Analysis. As mentioned above, the two variables rmses and rmsef
seem to lead the rest of the indicators. We obtain a maximum average cross-
correlation at 8 and 5 lags, respectively. When estimating the common factors,
we follow Stock and Watson (2002) and account for the lead characteristics of
these variables. Table 1.1 shows the loading coefficients of the first three princi-
pal components and the individual and cumulative variance proportions of those
components.
The first principal component (PC1) accounts for the major part of the dy-
namics of the data as it explains 62% of the total variation of the underlying
series. The second principal component (PC2) carries less information since it
explains only 13% of the variation. A scree test indicates that there are two
informative principal components in the dataset (the first two eigenvalues are
larger than one). Table 1.1 also shows that the contribution of the third princi-
pal component is relatively small. We conclude that the bulk of the variation is
explained by two principal components and the following analysis thus focuses
on these two components.
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Table 1.1: Principal component analysis
PC 1 PC 2 PC 3
Eigenvalues 4.98 1.07 0.72
Variance Proportion 0.62 0.13 0.09
Cumulative Proportion 0.62 0.76 0.85
Loadings R2
iqrs 0.34 0.34 −0.44 0.59
ents 0.31 0.44 −0.51 0.48
rmses 0.36 −0.04 0.31 0.63
iqrf 0.33 −0.56 −0.23 0.56
entf 0.33 −0.57 −0.26 0.54
rmsef 0.37 0.10 0.20 0.70
garch 0.38 0.09 0.40 0.72
ucsv 0.39 0.17 0.35 0.76
Note: R2 calculated from a regression of the respective individual uncertainty measure on
PC1.
From table 1.1, we infer that all eight loading coefficients of PC1 are positive
and lie between 0.31 and 0.39. That is, the loadings are all similar in magnitude
and each of the proposed measures therefore carries information we can use to
estimate unobserved inflation uncertainty.11 This is also reflected by the fact
that PC1 has noticeable explanatory power for each of the individual measures.
As indicated by the R2 in table 1.1, the variance share explained by PC1 varies
between 48% and 76%. Also note that the loadings suggest that, in applied
research, the idiosyncratic components can be successfully removed from the
data by taking a simple average of the individual measures.12
The first principal component is shown in figure 1.4. Following a rather tran-
quil period with moderate movements, PC1 starts to rise beginning roughly in
2007 followed by a surge towards the end of 2008, which coincides roughly with
the peak of the recent economic crisis. This is in line with, for instance, Clark
(2009) who documents that macroeconomic variability has recently been increas-
ing due to larger financial and oil price-related shocks. Also note that a large
part of the surge in uncertainty is only temporary as PC1 quickly drops to about
11Note that given the very similar factor loadings, PC1 remains virtually unaffected when
we exclude one measure from the analysis. Our results thus do not hinge on one individual
measure.
12Due to the CE survey, the main analysis is limited to a sample beginning in 1990. Hence,
our sample covers a rather tranquil period as far as inflation is concerned. To see whether
the results also hold for periods of high and volatile inflation, we conduct the analysis for the
years 1970 to 1995 considering only the forecast-based and model-based approaches. Our main
findings are also confirmed for the earlier time-span (see appendix 1.A.4).
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half the value of the 2008-peak in the subsequent months.
Figure 1.4: Uncertainty indicator (PC1)
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To analyze the information content of PC1, we study the co-movement of PC1
with economic variables that one would expect to be related to inflation uncer-
tainty. Contemporaneous correlations of PC1 and a collection of key variables
are presented in table 1.2. Results show that PC1 is closely linked to the variabil-
ity of nominal variables such as commodity prices, long-term interest rates, and
money. Similarly, variables representing financial market risk and stock prices
(vix, ted spreads, corporate bond spreads, and squared returns) seem to rise
with PC1. Moreover, PC1 appears to be positively linked to the variability of
production growth. Finally, all variables representing the business cycle indicate
that inflation uncertainty is associated with economic contraction. We also ob-
serve a negative association with short-term interest rates which are, in general,
pro-cyclical over the business cycle. Notably, the correlation obtained for long-
term interest rates is somewhat lower in absolute terms compared to short-term
rates. This is probably due to the fact that the long-term interest rate is partly
driven by the inflation risk premium, which tends to increase along with inflation
uncertainty.
1.3.3 Group-specific characteristics
We now shed some light on the idiosyncratic movements; i.e., the dynamics which
are specific to (some of) the individual measures. The informative part of the id-
iosyncratic dynamics is reflected in the second principal component (PC2) and we
thus use it to analyze the group-specific characteristics. The loadings associated
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Table 1.2: Correlations of principal components with economic and financial
variables
PC1 PC2 PC1 PC2
Consumer (∆π)2 0.40 0.14 wti −0.13
prices (∆πcore)2 0.18 −0.14 ppicomm −0.19 0.23
Money ∆M2 0.16 0.21 ppiind −0.19 0.20
aggregate (∆M2)2 0.33 0.15 Commodity crbreturn −0.32 0.28
ffr −0.45 −0.24 prices (∆wti)2 0.21
r3M −0.48 −0.24 (∆ppicomm)2 0.47 0.16
r10Y −0.23 −0.33 (∆ppiind)2 0.43 0.15
Interest ∆ffr −0.27 (∆crbreturn)2 0.39 0.18
rates ∆r3M −0.18 ism −0.47
∆r10Y Business ismprod −0.42
abs(∆ffr) −0.17 activity pmi −0.53 0.20
abs(∆r3M) −0.13 pmiprod −0.56 0.15
abs(∆r10Y ) 0.37 Consumer mhs −0.81
vix 0.51 climate confidence −0.61
Financial ted 0.30 Capacity cu −0.67
market risk risk 0.35 −0.20 utilization cuman −0.69
sp500 rate cuexIT −0.74
dj ∆y −0.81
Stock dj5000 ∆yman −0.82
prices sp5002 0.24 (∆y)2 0.55 −0.22
dj2 0.21 Production (∆yman)2 0.59 −0.20
dj50002 0.24 and ∆empl −0.77
house −0.64 0.18 employment ∆jobless 0.66 −0.17
House ∆house −0.17 ∆u 0.79 −0.16
prices (∆house)2 0.47 0.14 ur 0.55 −0.14
NBER dates recession 0.58 ∆ur 0.80 −0.15
Note: Positive correlations are printed in bold and negative correlations are in lightface.
Correlations that are insignificant at the 5% level do not appear in the table. A detailed
description of economic variables is given in table 1.A.3 in appendix 1.A.5.
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with PC2 provide insight into the interrelation of the individual uncertainty mea-
sures. We obtain positive loadings for survey disagreement iqrs and ents (0.34
and 0.44). That is, survey disagreement is governed by noticeable idiosyncratic
movements. By contrast, PC2 loads negatively on the two forecast-based dis-
agreement measures iqrf and entf (−0.56 and −0.57). From the opposite signs
of the loadings, we infer that PC2 represents a factor that drives survey-based
and forecast-based measures into opposite directions; the other measures do not
contribute to PC2 significantly.
The left panel of figure 1.5 depicts PC2, which is far from being white noise. To
identify situations where survey-based and forecast-based disagreement measures
move less synchronized, we analyze the contemporaneous correlations of PC2 to
economic variables in table 1.2. In opposition to PC1, PC2 tends to co-move
with the business cycle as we obtain a positive correlation with the Purchasing
Manager Index (pmi) and negative correlations with all unemployment-related
variables. Hence, the idiosyncratic part of iqrs and ents decreases during a
downswing while the idiosyncratic part of iqrf and entf tends to rise. Similarly, a
rise in commodity prices is associated with an increase in PC2, probably reflecting
the fact that these prices tend to co-move with the business cycle. Overall, survey
disagreement and the forecast-based disagreement measures tend to drift apart
during economic downturns.
Figure 1.5: Second principal component (PC2)
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Note: In the right panel, the bold lines show a twelve-month moving average of the second
principal component (black line, left axis) and the log of the corporate bond risk premium
(gray line, right axis). The thin line represents the unfiltered data.
Moreover, PC2 decreases when the corporate bond risk premium (risk) or the
output variability increases. Note that both variables are indicators for overall
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economic risk (see, for instance, Bachmann et al., 2013). As contemporaneous
correlations neglect dynamic relations, we plot PC2 along with the corporate risk
premium in the right panel of figure 1.5. For illustration purposes, we smooth
both series by taking a twelve-month centered moving average. We observe
that the risk premium and PC2 move in opposite directions. The pronounced
drop of PC2 around the year 2000 especially coincides with a distinct increase
of overall economic risk. Once the risk premium starts to come down, PC2
escalates and remains at a high level while economic risk stays low until 2007.
Thus, survey-based and forecast-based disagreement measures tend to drift apart
during economically turbulent times such that the idiosyncratic part of iqrs and
ents decreases while the idiosyncratic part of iqrf and entf mounts.
For an interpretation of the above findings, we draw attention to the concep-
tual ideas behind these measures. First, note that forecast-based and survey-
based disagreement measures are conceptually similar because both rely on a
number of different forecasts. In particular, we may interpret the multitude
of VAR models as a panel of forecasters where each forecaster uses a different
VAR model. A conceptual discrepancy arises from the fact that the forecast-
based approach provides a purely mechanistic way to deal with heterogeneous
information. As a consequence, forecasts from different VAR models almost in-
evitably diverge when indicators provide heterogeneous signals. By contrast, in
a survey, the way information is combined into a forecast is to a non-negligible
extent governed by subjective elements. For instance, the choice of a particu-
lar forecast model, the weights attached to different pieces of information, or
judgmental adjustments may influence the forecast reported. If forecasters are
risk-averse, they may choose to stick to the consensus if uncertainty is high,
and forecast dispersion may decline. Thus, an explanation for the divergence of
survey-based disagreement and forecast-based disagreement is that forecasters
may cluster their forecasts around the consensus during turbulent times. This
typically does not happen to the forecast-based measures. Being a mechanistic
approach, forecast-based disagreement, in fact, appears to overstate “true” in-
flation uncertainty. Overall, our results suggest that using only one individual
disagreement measure may be misleading during turbulent times. Note that this
finding is also consistent with theoretical considerations by Lahiri and Sheng
(2010b), who assume that individual forecast errors are driven by common and
idiosyncratic shocks. Under these assumptions, they show that disagreement is
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a reliable proxy for overall uncertainty only during stable periods; i.e., whenever
the shocks common to all forecasters are small.
1.3.4 Comparison to SPF inflation uncertainty
Many studies use uncertainty measures based on SPF data (see, for instance,
Zarnowitz and Lambros, 1987; Lahiri et al., 1988; Batchelor and Dua, 1993, 1996;
Giordani and So¨derlind, 2003; Chua et al., 2011). The reason is that the SPF
provides individual histograms of expected inflation. Due to this specific survey
design, we can derive for each forecaster i the individual standard deviation σi of
the inflation forecast. The average over individual standard deviations provides
an obvious measure of overall inflation uncertainty (Giordani and So¨derlind,
2003).
Ideally, our uncertainty indicator presented in section 1.3.2 should incorporate
information from SPF uncertainty as well. However, this is not feasible since
the SPF is conducted quarterly. Furthermore, SPF predictive densities relate to
fixed-event forecasts. Hence, a one-year horizon is polled only in the first quarter
of a year. As the forecast horizon shrinks in the subsequent quarters of the year,
the uncertainty surrounding the respective forecast also declines. Nevertheless,
we compare PC1 to SPF uncertainty but have to restrict our comparison to
yearly observations. Since one-year-ahead SPF forecasts are usually published
at the end of the first quarter, we compare the value of SPF uncertainty with
the value of PC1 in March of a respective year. To calculate forecaster-specific
uncertainty σi, we follow D’Amico and Orphanides (2008), and Lahiri and Sheng
(2010b) and use a non-parametric procedure. We obtain SPF uncertainty as the
average of individual standard deviations adding a Sheppard correction. Figure
1.6 depicts the resulting time series, which are both normalized to have mean
zero and standard deviation one.
SPF uncertainty moves rather abruptly with a spike in the year 1991 followed
by a decline and an upward movement in the last decade. In contrast, PC1
appears to be more persistent whereas the recent hike is more pronounced. The
first-order autocorrelation coefficient amounts to 0.41 for yearly data of PC1
whereas it is practically zero (0.09) for SPF uncertainty. Nevertheless, our un-
certainty indicator and SPF uncertainty co-move at large, and the correlation
coefficient is 0.45. We also compare SPF uncertainty to the individual measures,
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Figure 1.6: Yearly uncertainty indicator (PC1) and SPF uncertainty
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and we obtain a positive correlation for all measures. Moreover, PC1 appears
to have a higher correlation with SPF uncertainty than most of the individual
measures.13
Some limitations of such a comparison have to be noted. First, SPF uncer-
tainty refers to the GDP deflator as opposed to CPI inflation since probability
forecasts for the CPI inflation rate are not available before 2007. Moreover, a
number of assumptions have to be made to derive an uncertainty measure from
SPF forecast histograms (see, for instance, D’Amico and Orphanides, 2008; Rich
and Tracy, 2010). Furthermore, changes in the survey design concerning, for
example, the number and the width of histogram bins may distort the signal.
Overall, SPF uncertainty is very likely subject to idiosyncratic measurement er-
ror – as any other measure – which may explain a temporary divergence of SPF
uncertainty and PC1 (see also Batchelor and Dua, 1993, 1996).
1.4 The link between inflation and inflation un-
certainty
The relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty has recently gained
renewed relevance with the call for temporary higher inflation rates to mitigate
the problem of debt overhang. From a theoretical point of view, Friedman (1977)
argues that high inflation rates are less predictable than lower rates. Ball (1992)
formalizes the idea stating that inflation uncertainty increases in the event of
13For detailed results and a graphical representation, see figure 1.A.4 in appendix 1.A.6.
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higher inflation because the policy response is harder to predict (Friedman-Ball
hypothesis). In contrast, Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) argue that the link is
from inflation uncertainty to inflation. In a Barro-Gordon framework, they claim
that, with highly uncertain agents, the central bank has an incentive to create
surprise inflation to lower unemployment.
We use both PC1 and the individual measures to investigate the link between
inflation and inflation uncertainty. If we are able to remove the idiosyncratic
component from the individual measures, PC1 should yield a more precise and
robust estimate of the relation between inflation and inflation uncertainty since
it summarizes the information in the individual measures. To further examine
whether PC1 is a valid measure of uncertainty, we analyze the sign of the relation
between inflation and inflation uncertainty. Note that both theories, Friedman-
Ball and Cukierman-Meltzer, suggest that both variables co-move over time.
Although it is impossible to directly show that PC1 retraces the movements of
the unobserved “true” inflation uncertainty, we should be able to establish a
positive link if PC1 is a valid measure of inflation uncertainty.
First, we test the inflation-inflation uncertainty link by means of a Granger
causality test. To this end, we estimate bivariate VAR models containing in-
flation and one uncertainty measure. As we deal with monthly data, the lag
length is set to 12. Results of a Granger causality test are presented in table
1.3. The p-values reveal a strikingly inconclusive picture. rmses and iqrf seem
to be Granger caused by inflation, yet not vice versa, whereas for iqrs Granger
causality appears to hold for both directions. For ents, entf , and garch, we find
no dynamic relation to inflation. In the case of rmsef and ucsv, it is understood
that uncertainty is followed by inflation. When the same test is conducted for
the change of inflation, we also obtain divergent results across measures. Overall,
it appears that the choice of the measure is crucial. Using individual measures
therefore entails the risk that results are driven by idiosyncratic movements that
are unrelated to inflation uncertainty.
Using PC1 to measure inflation uncertainty, we find that inflation Granger
causes inflation uncertainty but not vice versa. Although Granger causality
is only a prerequisite for economic causality, such a result is in favor of the
Friedman-Ball hypothesis. The same result is obtained if we consider the change
in inflation.14 Most notably, results in table 1.3 suggest that PC1 provides an
14The result is robust to the choice of the lag length of the VAR according to BIC, which
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Table 1.3: Granger causality test for inflation uncertainty and inflation
PC1 irqs ents rmses iqrf entf rmsef garch ucsv
H0: π does not Granger cause IU 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.58 0.07 0.07 0.91
H0: IU does not Granger cause π 0.39 0.01 0.31 0.27 0.17 0.29 0.01 0.50 0.03
H0: ∆π does not Granger cause IU 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.02 0.01 0.64 0.07 0.01 0.90
H0: IU does not Granger cause ∆π 0.29 0.19 0.14 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.19 0.02
Note: Granger causality tests are conducted for inflation pi as well as the monthly change of
inflation ∆pi and inflation uncertainty (IU). Numbers are p-values for a Granger causality
test performed by means of a joint F-test. The lag length of each VAR model is set to 12.
Sample ranges from 1990:M9 to 2009:M12.
insurance against idiosyncratic measurement error attached to the individual
measures.
Second, we assess the sign of the effect of an exogenous increase in inflation on
inflation uncertainty. We take a dynamic perspective and calculate impulse re-
sponse functions from the bivariate VAR models introduced above. Orthogonal
shocks are identified using a Cholesky ordering such that uncertainty instan-
taneously reacts to a shock to inflation.15 This is motivated by the fact that
uncertainty may move quickly when agents encounter new macroeconomic infor-
mation whereas inflation is comparatively slow-moving.
The upper-left panel of figure 1.7 presents the response of the uncertainty
indicator PC1 to a one-standard deviation shock to inflation. Following an infla-
tion shock, we observe that uncertainty experiences an initial significant decline
for about two months. In other words, directly after the shock, a forecast for
subsequent periods seems to be less uncertain. This may be due to the fact that
– given the sluggishness of inflation – a forecast is relatively easy in the period
directly following the inflation shock. Let us consider an inflation shock that is
the result of a sudden increase in oil prices. Having observed the shock, this
very likely decreases uncertainty associated with future inflation. The reason is
that forecasters may be relatively sure to observe an increase in inflation rates
during the first few months after the shock. In the following periods, inflation
uncertainty displays a hump-shaped pattern. It quickly increases and becomes
significantly positive about five months after the shock occurred. Thus, the more
suggests two lags (see appendix 1.A.7). Furthermore, it is robust if we exclude the recent crisis
and end the sample in 2007:M8, which is roughly when the US sub-prime crisis started to spill
over into other sectors of the economy (see appendix 1.A.8).
15We also checked the reverse ordering of variables, which does not affect the results in a
significant way.
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time that has elapsed since the shock, the more uncertainty is attached to the
future course of inflation. Again, let us consider a sudden increase in oil prices.
In this case, uncertainty accumulates over time because the long-term effects of
such an inflation shock – e.g. via second round effects – are less clear-cut. The
response of uncertainty to a shock to oil price inflation (wti) is depicted in the
upper-right panel of figure 1.7. The pattern of the impulse response function very
much resembles the response of PC1 to an innovation in inflation. Hence, the
plot confirms the hypothesis that the short-term impact of increasing oil prices
seems to be relatively clear-cut, whereas longer lasting effects on the inflation
rate are uncertain.16
Turning to the lower panel of figure 1.7, we observe that a shock to core
inflation (πcore) also induces a rise in uncertainty. Here, it takes about four
months until uncertainty increases. In contrast to CPI inflation, a shock to core
inflation does not induce a fall in uncertainty in the first periods. We take this
as further evidence that the initial decrease in uncertainty after a shock to CPI
inflation is traceable to the energy component in CPI. That is, once an energy
price shock has materialized, the short-run impact of this shock on inflation
seems to be well known, and consequently reduces forecast uncertainty. In the
long run, however, the rise in uncertainty is even more pronounced after a shock
to CPI inflation than after a core inflation shock. Notably, following a one-time
increase in core inflation, uncertainty persistently remains on a higher level.
Taken together, we document a significant increase of inflation uncertainty
following an inflation shock. That is, PC1 co-moves with inflation. We highlight
that the increase is probably due to growing uncertainty about the transmission
of a shock. In addition, increased inflation uncertainty may also be the result of
rising uncertainty about the reaction of the central bank. The latter scenario is
very much in the spirit of Friedman (1977), who recognizes that, given rising rates
of inflation, economic agents become more and more uncertain about the timing
and pace at which inflation will return to lower levels again. Overall, PC1 delivers
results consistent with standard theory on the inflation-inflation uncertainty link.
Such a finding provides evidence to support the claim that PC1 is a valid measure.
In contrast, when we repeat the exercise for each individual uncertainty measure,
16See appendix 1.A.9 for results obtained from monetary VARs containing output, inflation,
a short-term interest rate, and inflation uncertainty. Our results remain unaffected when a
larger VAR is employed. Furthermore, the impulse response is qualitatively the same when we
estimate the bivariate VAR on a sample ending in 2007:M8 (see appendix 1.A.8).
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we find that the response of uncertainty is rather heterogeneous.17 Hence, the
link from inflation to inflation uncertainty is not revealed in a conclusive way if
we rely on a single measure.
Figure 1.7: Response of inflation uncertainty to inflation, wti, and core inflation
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Note: Confidence intervals are obtained from a bias adjusted bootstrap procedure (Kilian,
1998).
Finally, we analyze whether the contribution of inflationary shocks to PC1
is meaningful in an economic sense. To this end, table 1.4 presents the forecast
error variance decomposition associated with the bivariate VAR models shown in
figure 1.7. We find that an inflation shock explains roughly 21% of the forecast
error variance of inflation uncertainty after 15 months. With a value of only
7.7% after 15 months, core inflation (πcore) explains less than headline inflation
suggesting that the energy component in the CPI is a major determinant of
17The individual impulse responses are illustrated in figure 1.A.8 in appendix 1.A.10.
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inflation uncertainty. Likewise, the contribution of oil price inflation (wti) peaks
in the longer run at about 22%, which confirms the importance of oil price
movements for uncertainty.
Table 1.4: Forecast error variance decomposition
horizon 1 5 10 15 20 25
π 3.2 6.8 14.0 20.6 15.2 10.7
wti 0.1 2.8 11.8 22.2 21.6 19.8
πcore 0.4 1.5 4.7 7.7 7.4 7.6
Note: Numbers (as % of total variance) give the part of the variance of inflation uncertainty
explained by a shock to the respective economic variable. The respective values are derived
from bivariate VAR models. Variance decompositions are presented for a horizon of 1, 5,
10, 15, 20, and 25 months.
1.5 Concluding remarks
After analyzing various measures of inflation uncertainty, we document that in-
flation uncertainty has risen significantly in the aftermath of the recent financial
crisis. This finding, together with the recent calls for higher inflation to miti-
gate the problem of debt overhang highlights the importance of understanding
the relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty. However, empirical
results derived from different measures are ambiguous. An explanation is that
each individual measure relies on different assumptions which are very likely not
fulfilled completely. Hence, individual measures may be subject to idiosyncratic
measurement error.
We use common information in different uncertainty measures to eliminate
the idiosyncratic measurement error. To this end, we calculate survey-based
measures as well as measures derived from time series models, and we propose
a forecast-based approach. We find that all measures – including disagreement
– are driven by a common component, which we interpret as an indicator for
inflation uncertainty. Notably, the indicator helps to overcome the idiosyncratic
measurement error problem, and the underlying signal should be revealed with
greater precision. Moreover, we find that the loadings of the individual measures
on the common component are approximately equal. Therefore, taking a simple
average over the individual measures is a viable alternative which delivers a
robust indicator of inflation uncertainty.
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Our indicator of inflation uncertainty does not completely explain the vari-
ation in the data. In general, individual measures tend to differ more during
turbulent times. From the idiosyncratic dynamics not captured by the common
component, we infer that a researcher may be confronted with survey respon-
dents sticking to the consensus when macroeconomic risk is high, which induces a
downward bias in survey disagreement. In contrast, forecast-based disagreement
might overstate “true” inflation uncertainty. Hence, using only one individual
disagreement measure is a risky strategy.
Subsequently, we use the proposed uncertainty indicator to analyze the link
between inflation and inflation uncertainty. Our results based on Granger causal-
ity tests are in favor of the Friedman-Ball hypothesis. We also study the dynamic
response of uncertainty to an inflation shock. We document that uncertainty ini-
tially decreases and shows a swift increase in subsequent periods. This behavior
is traceable to the energy component in CPI inflation. A sudden rise in the oil
price, for instance, is followed by an initial decrease in inflation uncertainty. In
the longer run, uncertainty eventually rises because long-term effects of these
oil price increases appear to be harder to predict. Overall, we demonstrate that
higher inflation is followed by higher uncertainty. However, we are aware of the
difficulty of inferring causality by empirical testing only. In future research, it
would certainly be fruitful to increase the effort to integrate inflation uncertainty
into a structural macroeconomic model in order to establish a causal economic
relationship.
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Appendix
1.A.1 Dataset to estimate forecast-based measures
Table 1.A.1: Variables used to forecast inflation
Variable Transformation
Average hourly earnings (nonfarm payroll) change of growth rate
Building permits for new private housing units growth rate
Capacity utilization (manufacturing) growth rate
Crude oil index change of growth rate
Employment (non-agricultural industries) gap measure
Federal funds effective rate growth rate
Interest rate spread –
M3 change of growth rate
New orders (manufacturing) growth rate
Nominal narrow effective exchange rate growth rate
OECD composite leading indicators growth rate
Personal income growth rate
Retail sales growth rate
Total production gap measure
Unemployment rate gap measure
Note: “gap measure” denotes series that have been detrended with the Hodrick-Prescott
filter; “interest rate spread” is defined as the difference between interest rate on government
bonds and federal funds rate.
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1.A.2 Using real-time data
To see whether our results are affected by data revisions, we recalculate the
forecast-based measures using real-time data whenever consistently available
since 1970. This is the case for the CPI, employment, the unemployment rate,
and industrial production which are taken from the FRED database. We use the
four real-time series with the remaining 12 variables (e.g., new orders, interest
spread, and M3) to build the rolling VAR models. As in the main body of the
paper, we proceed as follows: For each vintage, we use the Hodrick-Prescott filter
to obtain detrended values of employment, the unemployment rate, and indus-
trial production. From the forecasts of the VAR models, we calculate the three
uncertainty measures. The resulting series are depicted in figure 1.A.1 along
with the original forecast-based measures from the main part of the paper. The
measures iqrf , entf and rmsef co-move closely with their real-time equivalent
(the correlation coefficient is 0.75, 0.84 and 0.97, respectively). Moreover, we
calculate the Mean Absolute Revision of CPI inflation between the first vintage
and the value reported half a year later between 1972 (first year with CPI vintage
data) and 2009. On average, CPI inflation was revised only by 0.019 percentage
points during this time span. Hence, in our framework, revisions of the target
variable CPI inflation are – in opposition to the GDP deflator – rather negligible.
Figure 1.A.1: Forecast-based measures estimated from revised and from real-
time data
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1.A.3 How strongly do individual measures “disagree”?
In section 1.3.1, we document that individual measures have the tendency to drift
apart during more turbulent times, as reflected by their cross-sectional standard
deviation. In the following, we examine whether the increase of the standard
deviation in figure 1.3 in the paper is traceable to a particular measure. For
this purpose, figure 1.A.2 displays the absolute deviation of each measure from
the cross-sectional mean at each point in time. We find that the deviation from
the mean varies over time for all measures. Overall, we cannot identify a single
measure that drives the standard deviation shown in figure 1.3 in the main text.
Figure 1.A.2: Absolute deviation of individual uncertainty measures from mean
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Note: The bars represent the absolute deviation of each measure from the mean, which is
calculated as the average over all individual measures for each point in time.
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1.A.4 Uncertainty indicator for the period 1970-1995
Due to the CE survey data, our main analysis is limited to a sample starting
in 1990, which covers a rather tranquil period as far as inflation is concerned.
To see whether our results also hold for periods of high and volatile inflation,
we conduct the analysis for the years 1970 to 1995 and, consequently, consider
only the forecast-based and model-based approaches. For this purpose, we first
calculate the three forecast-based measures (iqrf , entf , rmsef ) for the longer
time-span. To be consistent with the analysis in the paper, we rely on a rolling
window covering 20 years of data. Hence, we estimate the VAR models starting
with a data window 1950:M1-1969:M12 and iterate further until the last period
(1975:M1-1995:M12). Second, we estimate the GARCH and the UC-SV model
over a rolling data window for the same sequence of time periods. Following
this, we perform the principal component analysis for the sample ranging from
1970 to 1995. Results of the principal component analysis are presented in table
1.A.2, and the first principal component is plotted in figure 1.A.3.
Table 1.A.2: Principal component analysis (1970-1995)
PC 1 PC 2 PC 3
Eigenvalues 2.89 1.02 0.53
Variance Proportion 0.58 0.20 0.11
Cumulative Proportion 0.58 0.78 0.89
Loadings R2
iqrf 0.41 0.58 −0.31 0.49
entf 0.42 0.55 0.37 0.51
rmsef 0.43 −0.40 0.66 0.54
garch 0.46 −0.36 −0.56 0.61
ucsv 0.50 −0.27 −0.12 0.73
Note: R2 calculated from a regression of the respective individual uncertainty measure on
PC1.
Evidently, our main results can also be replicated for the earlier time-span.
First, we document a common component which explains with 58% the majority
of variation in the data. Second, all individual measures contribute to this com-
mon component with a non-negligible weight and similar loadings. As depicted in
figure 1.A.3, the combined measure indicates high inflation uncertainty during
the pre-Volcker period of accommodating monetary policy and rising inflation
rates. Inflation uncertainty starts to decline with the set-in of disinflationary
policy at the beginning of the 1980s and bottoms out in the early 1990s with
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temporary increases around 1987 (“Black Monday”) and 1991 (recession date
according to the National Bureau of Economic Research).
Figure 1.A.3: PC1 for the period 1970-1995
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Table 1.A.3: Description of economic variables
Variable Description Variable Description
(∆π)2 Squared change of inflation wti Oil price inflation - West Texas Intermediate spot price for crude oil
(∆πcore)2 Squared change of core inflation ppicomm Producer price inflation - Commodities
∆M2 MoM change of M2 money supply ppiind Producer price inflation - Industrial commodities
(∆M2)2 Squared change of M2 money supply crbreturn Commodity price inflation - Reuters/CRB total return index
ffr Federal funds rate (∆wti)2 Squared change of WTI oil price
r3M 3-month treasury bill rate (∆ppicomm)2 Squared change of producer price inflation (commodities)
r10Y 10-year government benchmark, average yield (∆ppiind)2 Squared change of producer price inflation (industrial commodities)
∆ffr MoM change of federal funds rate (∆crbreturn)2 Squared returns Reuters/CRB total return index
∆r3M MoM change of 3-month treasury bill rate ism ISM manufacturing total index
∆r10Y MoM Change of 10-year government benchmark rate ismprod ISM manufacturing production index
abs(∆ffr) Absolute change of federal funds rate pmi Chicago PMI total index of business activity
abs(∆r3M) Absolute change of 3-month T-Bill pmiprod Chicago PMI production index of business activity
abs(∆r10Y ) Absolute change of 10-year government benchmark rate mhs Consumer survey index - Michigan Household Survey
vix CBOE Market volatility index confidence Consumer confidence index - Conference board
ted Difference between interest rates on interbank loans and treasury bill rate cu Capacity utilization rate, total industry
risk Difference between interest rates on corporate bonds and government benchmarks cuman Capacity utilization rate, manufacturing
sp500 Standard & Poor’s 500 Index returns cuexIT Capacity utilization rate, manufacturing excluding IT
dj Dow Jones Index returns ∆y Change of monthly index of industrial production
dj5000 Dow Jones 5000 Index returns ∆yman Change of monthly index of manufacturing production
sp5002 Squared returns Standard & Poor’s 500 Index (∆y)2 Squared change of industrial production
dj2 Squared returns Dow Jones Index (∆yman)2 Squared change of manufacturing production
dj50002 Squared returns Dow Jones 5000 Index ∆empl Change of nonfarm-payroll employment
house House price inflation by S&P/Case-Shiller ∆jobless Change of initial jobless claims
∆house MoM change of house price inflation ∆u Change of unemployment
(∆house)2 Squared change of house price inflation ur Unemployment rate
recession NBER recession dummy (recession: 1, no recession: 0) ∆ur Change of unemployment rate
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1.A.6 Comparison of individual uncertainty measures to
SPF inflation uncertainty
Figure 1.A.4: Yearly individual uncertainty measures and SPF uncertainty
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Note: Correlation coefficients of the yearly individual uncertainty measures and SPF un-
certainty are, respectively, 0.48 (iqrs), 0.50 (ents), 0.27 (rmses), 0.29 (iqrf ), 0.39 (entf ),
0.22 (rmsef ), 0.36 (garch), and 0.33 (ucsv).
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1.A.7 Sensitivity of Granger causality tests
In the following, we check the sensitivity of the Granger causality tests presented
in section 1.4 of the paper. As a first robustness exercise, we show that our results
are robust with respect to the choice of the lag length. For each of the bivariate
VAR models, we selected the number of lags according to BIC and subsequently
performed the Granger causality test. Table 1.A.4 displays the results of this test
and the corresponding lag length. For the VAR models comprising the level of
inflation π, the BIC selects lags between 2 and 3. In contrast, a lag length of 12 is
broadly supported for the change in inflation ∆π. Note that we also obtain a lag
length of 12 lags in the majority of cases according to AIC. Evidently, a different
choice of the lag length does not change our main conclusions. We still obtain
mixed results concerning the direction of Granger causality with respect to the
individual measures. Moreover, the lag length does not influence the results of
the Granger causality test for PC1. In contrast, results for some of the individual
measures hinge on the lag length chosen (cp. table 1.3 in the main text).
Table 1.A.4: Sensitivity of Granger causality test w.r.t. selected lag length
PC1 irqs ents rmses iqrf entf rmsef garch ucsv
H0: π does not Granger cause IU 0.04 0.00 0.87 0.43 0.48 0.46 0.22 0.72 0.91
H0: IU does not Granger cause π 0.21 0.01 0.71 0.07 0.15 0.14 0.01 0.41 0.58
Lag length (BIC) 2 3 2 3 2 2 3 2 2
Lag length (AIC) 12 11 12 12 11 3 12 12 11
H0: ∆π does not Granger cause IU 0.00 0.00 0.82 0.02 0.82 0.53 0.07 0.01 0.90
H0: IU does not Granger cause ∆π 0.29 0.19 0.90 0.01 0.55 0.85 0.00 0.19 0.02
Lag length (BIC) 12 12 2 12 2 1 12 12 12
Lag length (AIC) 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Note: Granger causality tests are conducted for inflation pi as well as the monthly change of
inflation ∆pi and inflation uncertainty (IU). Numbers are p-values for a Granger causality
test performed by means of a joint F-test. The lag length of each VAR model is selected
according to BIC. Sample ranges from 1990:M9 to 2009:M12.
As a second robustness exercise, we ignore the forward-looking information
in the individual rmse measures. That is, we use contemporaneous values of
rmses and rmsef instead of lagged values to estimate PC1 (cp. section 1.3.2)
and subsequently conduct the Granger causality test presented in table 1.A.5.
It is obvious that timing matters for the two individual rmse measures as the
results of the Granger causality test become partly insignificant. In contrast, the
results for PC1 are not affected.
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Table 1.A.5: Sensitivity of Granger causality test w.r.t. timing of rmses and
rmsef
PC1 irqs ents rmses iqrf entf rmsef garch ucsv
H0: π does not Granger cause IU 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.24 0.02 0.58 0.13 0.07 0.91
H0: IU does not Granger cause π 0.55 0.01 0.31 0.37 0.17 0.29 0.21 0.50 0.03
H0: ∆π does not Granger cause IU 0.01 0.00 0.30 0.23 0.01 0.64 0.17 0.01 0.90
H0: IU does not Granger cause ∆π 0.22 0.19 0.14 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.19 0.02
Note: Granger causality tests are conducted for inflation pi as well as the monthly change of
inflation ∆pi and inflation uncertainty (IU). Numbers are p-values for a Granger causality
test performed by means of a joint F-test. The lag length of each VAR model is set to 12.
Sample ranges from 1990:M9 to 2009:M12.
1.A.8 Excluding the recent crisis from the sample
Figure 1.A.5 shows the uncertainty indicator PC1 and an indicator derived from
a sample that excludes the recent financial and economic crisis, PC12007. The
differences between both measures are relatively small and in some time periods
even non-existent, with a correlation coefficient of 0.98.
Figure 1.A.5: Uncertainty indicator excluding the recent crisis
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Note: The bold black line represents the indicator for inflation uncertainty (PC1) based on
the whole sample. The thin red line labeled PC12007 represents the uncertainty indicator
calculated based on a sample ending in 2007M8.
Testing the Granger causality with PC12007 clearly supports the Friedman-Ball
hypothesis. The null that inflation or the change in inflation does not Granger
cause the uncertainty indicator can be rejected with a p-value of 0.01 and 0.02,
respectively. In contrast, the reverse Granger causality cannot be confirmed
(the corresponding p-value is 0.90 and 0.99). The Friedman-Ball hypothesis is
also supported by the impulse response of PC12007 to a shock to inflation as
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illustrated in figure 1.A.6. When compared to figure 1.7 in the paper, the overall
pattern does not change; a one-standard deviation shock to inflation triggers a
significant increase in inflation uncertainty in the longer run. These robustness
checks suggest that our results are not solely driven by the recent financial crisis.
Figure 1.A.6: Response of inflation uncertainty to an inflation shock (1990:M9-
2007:M8)
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1.A.9 Alternative VAR specifications
In the following, we analyze whether the response of uncertainty to an inflation
shock is robust to alternative VAR specifications. To this end, we specify a
larger VAR model which is standard for monetary policy analysis. It includes
monthly data on industrial production, consumer prices, the federal funds rate,
and inflation uncertainty. Note that inflation uncertainty is ordered last. We
consider two alternatives. First, all variables except the interest rate enter in log-
levels. Second, we include production growth and inflation instead of production
and the price level. The resulting impulse response functions are presented in
figure 1.A.7. It is understood that our results remain unaffected by the inclusion
of additional variables.
Figure 1.A.7: Response of inflation uncertainty to a CPI shock and to an inflation
shock in a 4-variable VAR
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1.A.10 Impulse responses of individual uncertainty mea-
sures
Figure 1.A.8: Response of individual uncertainty measures
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Note: Confidence intervals are obtained from a bias adjusted bootstrap procedure (Kilian,
1998).
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Chapter 2
Synchronization and changes in
international inflation
uncertainty
2.1 Introduction
It is well known that increased inflation uncertainty may lead to economic cost.
For instance, higher uncertainty about future inflation might trigger a dispropor-
tionate reallocation from nominal to real assets and makes nominal contracts in-
volving wages and financial assets riskier (Fischer and Modigliani, 1978; Bernanke
and Mishkin, 1997).1 Moreover, a strand of literature stresses that higher infla-
tion uncertainty is typically associated with higher inflation (Friedman, 1977;
Ball, 1992; Cukierman and Meltzer, 1986). As a consequence, inflation uncer-
tainty increases the cost of high inflation and hampers the anchoring of low
inflation expectations. Hence, understanding the evolution of inflation uncer-
tainty is crucial if we want to maintain the benefits of low and stable inflation
rates.2
Our study aims to provide additional insight into the international linkages of
1Recently, uncertainty shocks have also gained attention as drivers of business cycle fluctu-
ations. A growing amount of literature documents their potential effects on the real economy.
See, for example, Bloom (2009); Alexopoulos and Cohen (2009); Fernandez-Villaverde et al.
(2011); Bachmann et al. (2013); Baker et al. (2013).
2Consequently, a large number of empirical studies analyze the effects of increased inflation
uncertainty. Previous studies typically discuss its relation to inflation and output at the na-
tional level. See, for instance, Baillie et al. (1996), Grier and Perry (1998), Bhar and Hamori
(2004), Fountas and Karanasos (2007), Fountas (2010), and Caporale et al. (2012).
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inflation uncertainty. The contribution of the present paper is twofold. First, we
document the extent of co-movement of inflation uncertainty among the G7 and
analyze the sources of international synchronization. Second, we investigate the
origins of changes in the dynamics of national inflation uncertainty by accounting
for international factors and spillover effects from one country to another. We
tackle both questions with the help of a Factor-Structural Vector Autoregression
(FSVAR) model which allows for a decomposition of the total variation of in-
flation uncertainty in one country into the contributions of international shocks,
own shocks, and spillover effects.
A number of studies focus on common factors as a reason for business cycle
synchronization (see, for instance, Stock and Watson, 2005; Kose et al., 2008).
Likewise, incomplete exchange rate adjustment and exposure to global shocks,
such as, oil-supply or commodity price shocks, provide a basis for a common
component in national inflation rates (see, for instance, Ciccarelli and Mojon,
2010; Mumtaz and Surico, 2012). Bataa et al. (2013a) analyze international
linkages of inflation between major industrialized countries. They provide evi-
dence of increased co-movement among the Euro area countries as well as a rising
correlation between the US, Canada and the Euro area aggregate. We extend
this literature by analyzing the degree and sources of synchronization of inter-
national inflation uncertainty. We consider common shocks and spillover effects
as possible explanations for synchronization of inflation uncertainty in the G7
and quantify the importance of each of these components for national inflation
uncertainty.
Another strand of literature documents a decline in the volatility of inflation
in the US since the mid-eighties (Stock and Watson, 2007, 2010; Cogley et al.,
2010; Canova and Ferroni, 2012, see). Cecchetti et al. (2007) demonstrate that
the volatility of trend inflation has also decreased over time in the other G7
countries which constitutes an “Inflation Stabilization” process. Bataa et al.
(2013a,b) analyze the nature and timing of the changes in international inflation
uncertainty by means of a statistical break test. In particular, for most G7
countries, they document a structural break in the volatility of inflation in the
mid-eighties which is followed by a decline in inflation uncertainty.3 In this
3As documented by Bataa et al. (2013b), in Canada, the US, and (to a lesser extent) in the
Euro area, the decline appears to be only temporary as the volatility of inflation shocks began
to rise in the late nineties again.
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paper, we investigate how the inflation uncertainty process has changed over
time and place emphasis on changes in the stability of inflation uncertainty.
In order to shed light on the sources of these changes, we quantify the role of
the size of shocks impinging on inflation uncertainty (“good or bad luck”). In
addition, we assess to what extent changes in the structure of the economy and
(monetary) policy stance have altered the propagation of these shocks (“good or
bad policy”).4
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, we find evidence of syn-
chronization among inflation uncertainty in the G7 notably at business cycle
frequencies. We show that the degree of synchronization has increased during
the recent two decades. Second, we reveal a common shock that moves domestic
inflation uncertainty in all G7 countries into the same direction. We find that
this common shock is closely related to oil and commodity price uncertainty. By
contrast, shocks originating in the US have an impact on a subset of countries
only. Third, based on recursive estimations, we document that there has been
a marked increase in the stability of inflation uncertainty, paralleling the “In-
flation Stabilization” process. To the best of our knowledge this has not been
documented elsewhere. Fourth, we document that the propagation mechanism
of shocks to inflation uncertainty in the G7 has changed considerably over time.
It appears that domestic shocks translate less extensively into the individual
economies. We interpret this finding in favor of the “good policy” hypothesis.
Finally, the relative importance of international shocks has increased over time,
which provides an explanation for the higher degree of synchronization among
the G7.
The paper is organized as follows. We introduce our measure of inflation un-
certainty in section 2.2. In section 2.3, we examine the degree of synchronization
of G7 inflation uncertainty and test for structural breaks in the inflation uncer-
tainty process. The set-up of the FSVAR model is explained in section 2.4. The
empirical results of the FSVAR estimation are presented in section 2.5. Section
2.6 summarizes and provides conclusions.
4A similar approach has been used, for instance, by Ahmed et al. (2004), Stock and Watson
(2005), Giannone et al. (2008), Justiniano and Primiceri (2008), and Gal´ı and Gambetti (2009)
to analyze the sources of the “Great Moderation” in the US.
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2.2 Measuring inflation uncertainty
Before turning to the main analysis we require a measure of unobserved inflation
uncertainty. Ideally, uncertainty is derived from subjective probability density
functions of decision makers. Such a measure relies on information about the
subjective probability that future inflation will fall in a certain range. For the
US, a number of studies use these types of uncertainty measures (see, for example,
Zarnowitz and Lambros, 1987; Giordani and So¨derlind, 2003; Rich and Tracy,
2010). However, consistent data for a longer time span including all G7 countries
are not available at this present time.5 This is why we opt for a model-based
measure which has the advantage of being consistently available for a long history
to analyze the international linkages among the G7.
In this study we use a stochastic volatility model which has recently been
proposed to model uncertainty (see, for instance, Fernandez-Villaverde et al.,
2011; Dovern et al., 2012). The stochastic volatility model – in contrast to a
GARCH model – allows for a separate innovation impinging on volatility (see, for
instance, Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez, 2010). Moreover, Grimme
et al. (2011) show that a measure based on stochastic volatility compares well
with other (survey-based) measures of inflation uncertainty. We derive the mea-
sure from an unobserved component model with stochastic volatility (UC-SV).
Notably, Stock and Watson (2007) show that the UC-SV model captures the
salient features of inflation and that it is very well suited as a forecast device.
One reason for the comparatively good forecast performance is that it decom-
poses inflation into a stochastic trend and a transitory component. The UC-SV
model is given by equations (2.1) to (2.5).
πt = π¯t + ηt ηt ∼ N(0, σ
2
η,t) (2.1)
π¯t+1 = π¯t + ǫt ǫt ∼ N(0, σ
2
ǫ,t) (2.2)
log σ2η,t+1 = log σ
2
η,t + ν1,t (2.3)
log σ2ǫ,t+1 = log σ
2
ǫ,t + ν2,t (2.4)(
ν1,t ν2,t
)′
∼ N(0, γI2) (2.5)
5Subjective probability densities are provided for the US by the Survey of Professional
Forecasters (SPF) maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, the ECB’s Survey
of Professional Forecasters which polls expectations about aggregate Euro area data, and the
Survey of External Forecasters conducted by the Bank of England.
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In this state-space model the trend π¯t is modeled as a random walk with a level
shock ǫt. The innovation process ηt captures the transitory part. The setting
incorporates second moment shocks ν1,t and ν2,t which inflate the volatility of
the process. The model is estimated with the Gibbs sampler.6 An increase in
the standard deviation of the permanent shock reflects that trend inflation is
subject to larger changes which translate into larger forecast errors. Hence, σǫ,t
may be interpreted as long-term inflation uncertainty. Since it is reasonable to
assume that policy makers are more concerned with uncertainty about long-term
inflation, we follow Cecchetti et al. (2007) and focus on σǫ,t.
Our sample comprises the G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
United Kingdom, and the US) over the period 1960:M1-2012:M4. We measure
inflation as the annualized monthly percent change in the Consumer Price Index
(CPI) given by 1200× log(CPIt/CPIt−1). The inflation series are obtained from
the OECD database and are seasonally adjusted. Finally, outliers in the data
have been removed, most of which are attributable to announced changes in the
value-added tax rate.7
Figure 2.1 shows the uncertainty measures together with actual inflation. A
similar pattern emerges for the G7. In light of the high inflation rates observed
in the seventies, we measure a steady increase in inflation uncertainty. This
upswing is followed by a marked reduction in volatility of inflation rates in the
mid-eighties which constitutes the process of “Inflation Stabilization” (Cecchetti
et al., 2007). During the end of the last decade, uncertainty has slightly risen
in the majority of the G7 economies. In particular, most uncertainty measures
peaked again during the Global Financial Crisis (see also Clark, 2009, and Dovern
et al., 2012, concerning this point).
6Estimation is based on the replication files of Stock and Watson (2007) which are avail-
able from Mark W. Watson’s website: http://www.princeton.edu/∼mwatson/publi.html. The
model has only one scalar parameter γ which determines the smoothness of the stochastic
volatility. Stock and Watson (2007) calibrate this parameter to γ = 0.20 for quarterly inflation
rates. Since we have monthly data which usually carries more noise, we set γ = 0.2/3.
7See appendix 2.A.1 for a detailed description of outlier adjustment.
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Figure 2.1: Inflation and long-term inflation uncertainty
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Note: The gray line represents actual inflation (left axis), the dark line represents the
long-term stochastic volatility measure of inflation uncertainty (right axis).
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2.3 Synchronization of inflation uncertainty in
the G7
The first contribution of our study is to assess the degree of synchronization of
inflation uncertainty among the G7. As proposed by Croux et al. (2001), we
calculate the dynamic correlation between each country pair which shows the
degree of synchronization at a given frequency. In the bivariate case, dynamic
correlation between two variables x and y is defined as
ρxy(λ) =
Cxy(λ)√
Sx(λ)Sx(λ)
, (2.6)
where Sx(λ) and Sy(λ) are the spectral density functions of x and y, −π ≤ λ < π
is the frequency, and Cxy(λ) is the cospectrum. The frequency λ is inversely
related to the number of periods per cycle, p = 2π
λ
. Given our monthly data, a
frequency of π
4
, for example, corresponds to a cycle of 8 months.8
For a group of countries, co-movement can be summarized by the measure
of cohesion which is defined as the (weighted) average of dynamic correlations
among all possible country pairs:
cohx(λ) =
∑
i 6=j wiwjρxixj(λ)∑
i 6=j wiwj
, (2.7)
where x denotes a vector of variables, and wi denotes the respective weight of
country i. We consider two approaches. First, dynamic correlations are weighted
equally with wi = 1. Second, we use weights according to the country’s share in
the aggregate GDP of the G7.
Confidence bands for both dynamic correlations and cohesion are obtained
from a bootstrapping procedure (see also Martin and Guarda, 2011). For each
country pair, we calculate the dynamic correlation of two random normally dis-
tributed series of the same sample size and standard deviation as the original
series. Based on 5, 000 replications, we construct a confidence band at every
frequency related to the null hypothesis that the two series are uncorrelated.
Confidence bands for cohesion are given by the (weighted) average of the indi-
vidual confidence bands.
8We depict the pairwise dynamic correlations in figure 2.A.1 in appendix 2.A.2. Results
show that dynamic correlations at business cycle frequencies are positive and significant for
most country pairs.
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The degree of synchronization as measured by cohesion is shown in figure 2.2.
Cohesion is depicted at frequencies on the interval [0, π/4], that is, from long-term
cycles on the left-hand side up to the shortest cycle of 8 months on the right-hand
side. The shaded area indicates the business cycle frequencies, which typically
cover 1.5 to 8 years. Generally, unweighted cohesion is significantly positive at
business cycle frequencies since it remains above the confidence bands related to
the null of no correlation. This finding suggests that business cycle frequencies
contribute extensively to the co-movement of uncertainty measures across G7
countries. This result is also confirmed when we measure cohesion as a weighted
average of G7 countries (dashed line in figure 2.2).
Figure 2.2: Cohesion of inflation uncertainty among the G7
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Note: The shaded area represents business cycle frequencies (8 to 1.5 years). Thin lines
report 95% bootstrap confidence intervals. The weighted average is calculated according
to the country shares in aggregate GDP of the G7 (based on values in US Dollars, constant
prices and constant PPPs, OECD base year). The uncertainty measures were differenced
beforehand. The Bartlett window size is set to 12.
Given that our sample comprises more than fifty years of data, we may wonder
whether there have been any major changes in the synchronization of inflation
uncertainty. Moreover, one possible reason for the synchronization in the last
fifty years may be that the countries experienced a common structural break. In
the following, we assess whether there have been mean and/or variance breaks
in the inflation uncertainty process. To this end, we conduct a standard sup-
Wald test (Andrews, 1993), which also helps us to infer when a change occurs
because it relies on the assumption of an unknown break date. For each country
in our sample, we compute the Wald form of the Quandt likelihood ratio (QLR)
statistic, maximized over the central 70% of the sample. The test for a mean
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break relies on an autoregressive model with 12 lags and the null hypothesis of
constant autoregressive lag coefficients. To ensure non-negative values, we take
the variables in logs. The test statistic for a break in the conditional variance is
based on the null of a constant variance of the error term of the autoregressive
model (see also Stock and Watson, 2003b). The test allows for the possibility of
two different break dates for the conditional mean and the conditional variance.
The p-values corresponding to the QLR test statistics and the estimated break
dates are reported in table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Break tests for inflation uncertainty
Conditional mean Conditional variance
p-value Break date 67% confidence interval p-value Break date 67% confidence interval
CND 0.05 0.41
FRA 0.00 1993:M12 1993:M10 - 1994:M02 0.00 1987:M04 1986:M12 - 1988:M08
GER 0.00 1990:M11 1990:M09 - 1991:M01 0.01 1987:M05 1985:M07 - 1990:M10
ITA 0.01 1984:M12 1984:M10 - 1985:M02 0.00 1977:M03 1976:M03 - 1979:M12
JPN 0.00 1973:M12 1973:M10 - 1974:M02 0.02 1996:M03 1990:M02 - 1998:M06
UK 0.02 1984:M11 1984:M09 - 1985:M01 0.04 1987:M01 1983:M12 - 1991:M07
US 0.00 1973:M03 1973:M01 - 1973:M05 0.04 1979:M06 1969:M11 - 1981:M10
Note: Estimation based on AR(12) models for log σǫ. The QLR test statistic on the
conditional mean refers to the null of no break in the AR lag coefficients. The test statistic
on the conditional variance refers to the null of no break in the variance of the AR error
term. The break date and its confidence interval are estimated by OLS according to Stock
and Watson (2005). Results are displayed only if the QLR test statistic is significant at
least at the 5% level.
We find evidence of breaks in the conditional mean as well as in the conditional
variance for all countries. One exception is Canada where the null of no change in
the mean and the null of no change in the AR innovations cannot be rejected at
the 5% level. Concerning the conditional mean, the estimated break date is quite
dispersed. Some countries experience a break during the first half of the seventies
(Japan and the US), others in the mid-eighties (Italy and UK), and some in the
beginning of the nineties (France and Germany). Hence, we cannot uniquely
identify a (common) break date in the mean of inflation uncertainty. Notably,
with the exception of France, the break occurs before the early nineties. Turning
to breaks in the conditional variance, there seems to be some clustering for
subgroups of countries. While variance shifts are detected in the late seventies in
Italy and the US, the break in France, Germany, and the UK appears to occur in
the late eighties. Again, most of the countries experience a break in the variance
before the early nineties. Japan is somewhat of an exception. Here, a break in the
conditional variance is indicated during the mid-nineties. Taken together, there
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have been marked changes in the dynamics of inflation uncertainty. However, it
is difficult to identify a common break taking place in all countries synchronously.
That is, the sources of the discrete breaks in the inflation uncertainty process
appear to be country-specific and, hence, are not well suited as an explanation
for the observed synchronization.
While we find evidence that inflation uncertainty in the G7 is intertwined in
the full sample, an open question is whether synchronization of inflation uncer-
tainty has changed over time. Given the above break dates, it appears reasonable
to split the sample in 1990, which is roughly in the middle of the period. Since
most countries have experienced a break before 1990, we compare synchroniza-
tion, again measured by cohesion, before and after the change in the dynamics of
inflation uncertainty. Figure 2.3 depicts cohesion calculated for the period 1960-
1989 and 1990-2012, respectively. It becomes evident that cohesion increases
considerably, that is, inflation uncertainty co-moves more strongly during the
second sub-sample.9
Figure 2.3: Cohesion of inflation uncertainty, 1960-1989 and 1990-2012
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Note: The shaded area represents business cycle frequencies (8 to 1.5 years).
9To test if the difference between the two sub-samples is statistically significant, we consider
changes in the bivariate correlations obtained for the bandpass-filtered version of inflation
uncertainty. Table 2.A.2 in appendix 2.A.3 reports the difference in pairwise correlations
between the sub-samples 1960-1989 and 1990-2012. Results show that the majority of pairwise
correlations has increased significantly.
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2.4 The Factor-Structural VAR model
The results presented in the previous section raise the question of why uncertainty
is synchronized in the G7 economies. In general, there might be two possible
causes: common (global) shocks to inflation uncertainty and spillover effects
from one country to another. To disentangle both channels, we rely on a Factor-
Structural VAR (FSVAR) model of the following form (see Stock and Watson,
2005):10
Yt = A(L)Yt−1 + vt (2.8)
vt = Λft + ξt (2.9)
E(vtv
′
t) = Σv (2.10)
E(ftf
′
t) = diag(σf1 , ..., σfk) (2.11)
E(ξtξ
′
t) = diag(σξ1 , ..., σξ7) (2.12)
Here, Yt is a 7×1 vector stacking the demeaned uncertainty measures of the G7.
The common factors are captured by ft, Λ is the 7× k matrix of factor loadings,
and ξt denotes the idiosyncratic shocks. By assumption, the idiosyncratic shocks
are uncorrelated with the common factors. The FSVAR model is estimated with
Maximum Likelihood.11 We set the lag length to 12, which should be enough
to capture the dynamics of the monthly data. In order to ensure non-negative
values of uncertainty, we take the log of σǫ,t.
According to equation (2.9), the error term of the FSVAR model is decom-
posed into country-specific idiosyncratic shocks and common shocks. Hence, a
country-specific shock originating, for instance, in the US may be distinguished
from a global shock. The global shock is identified by the assumption that it
impacts all countries immediately whereas idiosyncratic shocks have an impact
on other countries only via the autoregressive dynamics of the FSVAR model.
We emphasize that, by using monthly data, we are less restrictive than previous
studies dealing with business cycle synchronization based on quarterly data (see,
10The FSVAR set-up is also used by Altonji and Ham (1990), Norrbin and Schlagenhauf
(1996), and Clark and Shin (2000) to model regional spillovers. For an application to interna-
tional spillovers, see also Carare and Mody (2010) and Lahiri and Isiklar (2010).
11Estimations are based on the replication files of Stock and Watson (2005) which are avail-
able at Mark W. Watson’s website.
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for instance, Stock and Watson, 2005; Carare and Mody, 2010). In our case,
spillovers are assumed to occur after one month already, which implies that we
attribute less explanatory power to the global shock(s) than studies based on
quarterly data. However, if there are several global factors, these need to be
identified separately. A common approach is to impose zero restrictions on the
entries of Λ, the matrix of factor loadings (see, for instance, Stock and Watson,
2005; Gorodnichenko, 2006). We define Λ as an upper triangle where the first
factor loads onto all G7 countries, the second factor has a zero restriction on
the country ordered last (US), and the third factor has zero impact on both
last-ordered countries (UK and US).
In the next step, we have to pin down the number of common factors k which
is achieved by testing the overidentifying restrictions of the model. The null hy-
pothesis states that the FSVAR model has k common factors and 7 idiosyncratic
shocks whereas the alternative states that there are no restrictions imposed on
the covariance matrix of the reduced-form errors vt. The results of the corre-
sponding Likelihood Ratio (LR) test are presented in table 2.2. For the sample
1960-2012, the test supports one common factor as the null of k = 1 cannot be
rejected at the 5% level, although this is a borderline case since one factor can
still be rejected at the 10% level. We discuss the results of a specification with
two common factors in section 2.5.1 later in the text and in appendix 2.A.4.
Table 2.2: Testing for the number of common factors in the FSVAR model
k logL (104) d.f. LR Stat. p-value
0 20.5003 – − −
1 20.4897 14 21.30 0.09
2 20.4966 8 7.38 0.50
3 20.4991 3 2.48 0.48
Note: H0: The reduced-form error covariance matrix has a k-factor structure. H1: Unre-
stricted reduced-form error covariance. The number of overidentifying restrictions (d.f.)
is given by n(n + 1)/2 − (nk −
∑k−1
j=0 j + n) where n is the number of equations in the
FSVAR model.
2.5 Empirical results
This section presents the empirical findings of the FSVAR estimation. We first
analyze the importance of the three different types of shocks in each country.
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Second, we investigate the impulse responses of the individual countries to the
common shock as well as to a US shock. Third, we provide an economic inter-
pretation of the common shock. Finally, we assess to what extent changes in the
shock size or in the structure of the economy have altered the propagation of
these shocks (“good luck” or “good policy”).
2.5.1 How important are international shocks to inflation
uncertainty?
In the following, we assess the importance of the respective shocks impinging
on inflation uncertainty with a particular focus on the international dimension.
Since ξt and ft in the FSVAR model are uncorrelated by assumption, the forecast
error variance for each country can be decomposed into international shocks,
own shocks and spillovers received from other countries. Based on the FSVAR
estimation, figure 2.4 displays the contribution of the three different types of
shocks to the forecast error variance of inflation uncertainty at forecast horizons
up to 48 months.
The lower areas of figure 2.4 display the proportion of the international shock.
The common factor has a noticeable impact on the Euro area countries and the
UK. Table 2.A.3 in the appendix provides results for selected forecast horizons.
At the two-year horizon, the international factor captures up to 23% of the vari-
ance in the countries mentioned before. In contrast, for the North American
countries and Japan, the common factor remains at about 10% across all hori-
zons. For Japan, the contribution of the international factor is the smallest of
all countries.
The middle areas of figure 2.4 represent the proportion of spillovers. As noted
before, spillovers do not contribute to the forecast error variance at the one-month
horizon by assumption. Generally, the proportion of spillovers increases with the
forecast horizon. At the one-year horizon, the contribution of spillovers ranges
between 3% and 8%.12 In contrast, at the longest horizon, spillover-related shocks
explain a comparably large part of the variance of inflation uncertainty, notably
in Canada, France, Italy, and UK where the contribution ranges between 29%
and 44%. In the US and Japan, the proportion of spillovers is somewhat smaller
12Note that this compares roughly with the contribution of monetary policy shocks to infla-
tion documented in the literature (see, for instance, Christiano et al., 2005; Bernanke et al.,
2005).
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Figure 2.4: Variance decomposition
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Note: The above areas refer to the variance share of international shocks, spillovers, and
domestic shocks, respectively. The forecast horizon in months is plotted on the abscissae.
The results are based on an FSVAR model with one common factor and 12 lags.
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than in the other countries but comparable to the proportion of the international
shock. The turbulent economic situation of Japan during the nineties and early
2000s associated with the asset price bubble seems to be reflected by a higher
importance of domestic shocks. Likewise, Germany receives little spillover from
abroad. This result is in line with the fact that the German Bundesbank has
given very high priority to price stability during the entire sample period.
For most countries, the largest variance share is captured by domestic shocks,
as reflected by the upper areas in figure 2.4. Generally, the proportion of domestic
shocks declines with the forecast horizon in favor of the international component
(that is, in favor of common shocks or spillovers). At longer forecast horizons,
the largest proportion of domestic shocks can be found in Japan and the US.
Overall, the results of the decomposition suggest that domestic shocks play a
major role in the forecast error variance of inflation uncertainty.
Given that one common factor may be rejected in favor of two common factors
at the 10% level, we examine whether our results change when we introduce a
second international shock. In table 2.A.3 in the appendix, we provide the re-
sults of the forecast error variance decomposition of an FSVAR model with two
common factors. For the majority of countries, the fraction of variance explained
by the international component is practically unaffected if a second international
shock is added to the model. Moreover, the fraction of own shocks hardly de-
clines. Finally, the proportion explained by spillovers falls only marginally. A
difference occurs, however, in the case of the US. Here, we observe an increase in
the explained variance share; that is, the second shock adds explanatory power
mainly for US inflation uncertainty.13 Therefore, we believe that it is reasonable
to proceed the analysis with one international shock.
2.5.2 Impulse response analysis
To see whether the common factor ft qualifies for an international driver of in-
flation uncertainty, we calculate the response to a surprise increase in ft. Figure
2.5 displays the impulse response functions of the individual countries following
13The contribution of the two international shocks is also given separately in table 2.A.3. The
first international shock appears to be a shock that impinges on the US, and to a lesser extent,
on Canada whereas the second international shock mainly affects the remaining countries. Note
that this distinction is the result of the identification strategy concerning the factor loadings.
The assumption of a recursive structure entails that the second common shock does not affect
the US contemporaneously.
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a one-standard deviation shock to the common factor. We find that a surprise
innovation in the international factor shifts inflation uncertainty upwards in all
countries. The impulse response follows a hump-shaped pattern, with a strong
reaction in France, Italy, the UK and the US and a less pronounced increase
in Canada, Germany and Japan. As the common shock uniformly drives un-
certainty in the G7 economies into the same direction, ft may be interpreted
as an international shock to inflation uncertainty. Even more important, it pro-
vides a possible explanation for the synchronization which we document for these
countries in section 2.3.
Also of interest is whether the international shock may be distinguished from
a shock originating in the US. A sizeable impact of US shocks on the other G7
countries is, for example, documented by Bataa et al. (2013a). In the following,
we analyze the effect of a surprise innovation in US inflation uncertainty. The im-
pulse responses to a US shock are shown in figure 2.6. Note again that spillovers
have no impact at the one-month horizon by assumption. Consequently, the con-
temporaneous effect of a shock to US inflation uncertainty is zero. In contrast to
the common factor, the response to a US shock is mixed. In Canada, France, and
the UK, a surprise innovation in US inflation uncertainty generates a significant
rise which tends to be however smaller and less persistent than the response to
the international shock. For Germany and Japan, the reaction to the US in-
novation is insignificant. Hence, there seem to be country-specific differences,
probably pertaining to the monetary regime, that determine how much inflation
uncertainty spillover is received from the US. Given the countries’ rather mixed
reactions following a US shock, we conclude that the international factor can
be distinguished from a shock to US inflation uncertainty. Moreover, the US
innovation is only partly able to explain the synchronization among the G7.
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Figure 2.5: Response of inflation uncertainty to a shock to the common factor
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Note: The bold black line represents the response of inflation uncertainty in the respec-
tive country to a one-standard deviation shock in the common factor. The shaded areas
represent ± (2 times) the standard error.
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Figure 2.6: Response of inflation uncertainty to a US shock
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Note: The bold black line represents the response of inflation uncertainty in the respective
country to a one-standard deviation US shock. The shaded areas represent ± (2 times)
the standard error.
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2.5.3 Interpretation of the international shock
The following section aims to provide an economic interpretation of the inter-
national shock to inflation uncertainty. However, the FSVAR method does not
allow for a direct interpretation of the common shock, and we are thus depen-
dent on indirect evidence. A possible driver of international inflation uncertainty
is the uncertainty associated with prices of goods which are traded all over the
world at a common price, and which have a non-negligible share in the over-
all price index. Candidates are oil and commodity prices. Consequently, we
would expect that the uncertainty related with those variables is foreshadowed
by positive common shocks. We can infer whether ft and any other measure of
uncertainty are related by estimating the following regression:
uncit = c0 +
J∑
j=0
φijft−j + ν
i
t , (2.13)
where uncit represents a measure of uncertainty, and ν
i
t is the respective regres-
sion residual. Since ft is an orthogonal white noise process by assumption, the
coefficients φij are a measure of connectedness between unc
i
t and the common
shock. Moreover, owed to the simplicity of the regression model, the cumulative
coefficients can be interpreted as the impulse response of uncit following a one-
percent increase in ft (see, for instance, Kilian, 2009; Romer and Romer, 2010).
We estimate the model with J = 24 lags.
To obtain a measure of oil price uncertainty, we use the UC-SV model intro-
duced in section 2.2 and apply it to the monthly growth rate of the spot price for
crude oil (WTI). The estimation sample runs from 1979:M6 until 2012:M4 since
there is practically no monthly variation in WTI oil prices before that period.
In addition, we also use the CRB/Reuters commodity price index and derive
a measure of overall commodity price uncertainty in the same way. The CRB
is more comprehensive than the WTI oil price since it measures the price of a
basket of different commodities. Moreover, the CRB is available for the entire
sample period (1960:M1 until 2012:M4). In order not to run into stationarity
problems, uncit is the log-change of the respective standard deviation associated
with the long-term component of oil or commodity price inflation.
Figure 2.7 illustrates the dynamics of uncit following an increase in the com-
mon shock ft. It appears that both oil and commodity price uncertainty are con-
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Figure 2.7: Response of oil and commodity price uncertainty to ft
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Note: The solid line represents the response of uncit to a one-percent increase in ft. The
68% and 90% error bands are obtained by a block bootstrap using a block size of 12 and
20, 000 replications. The left panel depicts the response of WTI oil price uncertainty while
the right panel depicts the response of CRB commodity price uncertainty.
nected with the international shock to inflation uncertainty. Notably, increases
in the international shock seem to foreshadow increases in oil and commodity
price uncertainty.14 Taken together, our results provide evidence that ft may be
interpreted as a shock to international commodity price uncertainty which shows
up as a common shock to inflation uncertainty in the G7.
2.5.4 Changes in the dynamics of international inflation
uncertainty
Up to now, we have based the analysis on the full sample period. However,
the break test in section 2.3 already indicated that there have been changes to
the inflation uncertainty process during the last fifty years. In what follows,
we investigate whether and how the dynamics of inflation uncertainty in the
G7 have changed over time. To this end, we perform a recursive estimation of
the FSVAR model with one common factor. A time-varying specification based
on the whole sample is obtained by two-sided exponential weighting (Stock and
Watson, 2005; Bataa et al., 2013a), that is, the regression at time t is calculated
using weighted observations. The observation at time s receives an exponentially
decreasing weight δ|t−s| with a discount factor δ = 0.97. Running t = 1 . . . T
14In appendix 2.A.5, we also run the regression in equation (2.13) for a measure of finan-
cial market uncertainty used in Bloom (2009). We find no significant relation between the
international factor and financial market uncertainty.
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over the whole sample, we obtain a time-varying estimate for the volatility of
inflation uncertainty measured by the total forecast error variance. Note that
the weighted estimation implies a smooth transition of the coefficients over time.
It is therefore not possible to retrace sudden breaks in the data. Nevertheless,
the method provides us with an intuition of whether there have been changes
over the full sample period.
The time-varying forecast error variance of inflation uncertainty is depicted
in figure 2.8 from 1970:M1 onwards. In most countries, we observe a decline
in volatility taking place in the mid-eighties to the early nineties. Except for
Germany and Japan, a temporary increase in volatility can be observed in the
beginning of the new millennium. Towards the end of the sample, the variance
has decreased to historically low levels in all countries. The timing of the observed
changes suggests that the decline of the fluctuations of uncertainty has paralleled
the process of world-wide “Inflation Stabilization” (see, for instance, Cecchetti
et al., 2007; Mumtaz and Surico, 2012). Indeed, inflation uncertainty has not only
come down to lower levels but is now also much more stable and, consequently,
easier to predict.
In general, two possible explanations are at hand for the documented in-
crease in the stability of inflation uncertainty: either the size of the shocks has
decreased (“good luck”) or structural changes in the economy have dampened
the transmission of the shocks (“good policy”). In the following, we decompose
the decline of the total forecast error variance into the effect of the shock size
and the propagation of the different types of shocks. Given the break dates
obtained in section 2.3, we split the sample roughly in half and consider the
periods 1960-1989 and 1990-2012. This allows us to compare the forecast error
variance decompositions for the two different sub-samples. Moreover, we are
able to distinguish between changes in the shock size and changes in the im-
pulse response. Let Vp denote the variance of the forecast error, where p = 1; 2
refers to the first and second sub-sample, respectively. For notational simplicity,
we suppress the dependence on the forecast horizon and the country. Since the
FSVAR model incorporates eight sources of variation (one international shock,
one domestic shock, and six different spillover terms emerging from the idiosyn-
cratic shocks), the total variance can be written as Vp = Vp,1+ ...+Vp,8 with Vp,j
denoting the contribution of the jth shock in sub-sample p. Consequently, the
difference between the first- and the second-period variance can be expressed as
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Figure 2.8: Time-varying volatility of inflation uncertainty
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Note: The bold line refers to the twelve-months-ahead total forecast error variance of
inflation uncertainty. Results are derived from a recursively weighted estimation of an
FSVAR model with one common factor and 12 lags.
64
V2 − V1 = (V2,1 − V1,1) + ... + (V2,8 − V1,8). The variance of the forecast error
consists of two parts: Vp,j = apjσ
2
pj, where apj is given by the cumulated squared
impulse responses to a standardized (unit) shock j. σ2pj denotes the variance of
shock j in sub-sample p. For each shock j, the change in the contribution to the
total variance can be expressed as
V2j − V1j =
(
a1j + a2j
2
)
(σ22j − σ
2
1j) +
(
σ21j + σ
2
2j
2
)
(a2j − a1j). (2.14)
The first term on the right-hand side in equation (2.14) refers to the contribu-
tion from the change in the shock size whereas the second term refers to the
contribution from the change in the impulse response function. Table 2.3 reports
the decomposition of changes in the twelve-months-ahead forecast error variance
of inflation uncertainty. Focusing on the first panel, the total variance has de-
creased significantly in most countries during the second period, as shown in
column (3). That is, inflation uncertainty has become more stable and its pre-
dictability has increased. In Canada and Japan, the forecast error variance has
slightly increased; however, this increase is statistically insignificant. Overall,
the decline in volatility inferred from visual inspection of the recursive FSVAR
estimation above can be recovered when we split the sample.
The second panel of table 2.3 reports the contribution to the change in the
forecast variance by changes in the shock size. The decline in the forecast variance
is partly due to smaller shocks, as shown in column (7). This negative change
in the shock size is statistically significant for France, Italy, and the US. The
presence of smaller shocks suggests that “good luck” has contributed to the
decline of the volatility of inflation uncertainty in these countries. Concerning
the different shock types, mainly domestic shocks account for a decline in the
shock size. In the majority of countries, smaller spillovers also contributed to
this downward trend in a significant way. By contrast, international shocks are
larger in the second period, although this change is not statistically significant.
The third panel of table 2.3 displays the contribution of changes in the im-
pulse responses, that is, changes in the way shocks translate into the domestic
economy. As reported in column (11), the sensitivity towards shocks has gener-
ally decreased. In all countries except Canada and Japan, changes in the impulse
responses significantly contributed to the overall decline in variance. It appears
that “good policy” is responsible for most of the decline in the volatility of in-
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Table 2.3: Decomposition of changes in the forecast error variance
Total variances Contribution of change in shock size Contribution of change in impulse responses
1960-1989 1990-2012 Change Common Spillover Domestic Total Common Spillover Domestic Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
CND 2.74∗∗∗ 3.26∗∗∗ 0.53 0.05 −0.14∗ 0.33 0.24 0.08 0.05 0.16 0.29
(0.37) (0.45) (0.58) (0.13) (0.08) (0.30) (0.35) (0.42) (0.22) (0.39) (0.66)
FRA 24.75∗∗∗ 4.36∗∗∗ −20.39∗∗∗ 0.40 −0.41∗ −7.72∗∗∗ −7.73∗∗∗ −5.20∗∗∗ −0.37 −7.09∗∗∗ −12.66∗∗∗
(3.25) (0.61) (3.30) (0.61) (0.21) (1.39) (1.47) (1.58) (0.68) (1.70) (2.63)
GER 7.16∗∗∗ 1.92∗∗∗ −5.24∗∗∗ 0.15 −0.14∗ −0.77 −0.76 −2.06∗∗∗ −0.09 −2.33∗∗∗ −4.48∗∗∗
(0.96) (0.25) (0.99) (0.24) (0.08) (0.48) (0.48) (0.73) (0.23) (0.62) (0.97)
ITA 18.98∗∗∗ 5.80∗∗∗ −13.19∗∗∗ 0.09 −0.05 −5.84∗∗∗ −5.80∗∗∗ −1.19 −0.79 −5.40∗∗∗ −7.39∗∗∗
(2.56) (0.78) (2.67) (0.29) (0.15) (1.23) (1.31) (1.07) (0.56) (1.76) (2.29)
JPN 2.88∗∗∗ 3.47∗∗∗ 0.59 0.02 −0.26∗∗ 0.58∗∗ 0.34 −0.21 0.52∗ −0.06 0.25
(0.38) (0.47) (0.60) (0.07) (0.11) (0.27) (0.31) (0.26) (0.31) (0.45) (0.63)
UK 8.72∗∗∗ 3.89∗∗∗ −4.83∗∗∗ 0.13 −0.29∗ −0.56 −0.72 −1.41 −0.90∗ −1.81∗∗ −4.11∗∗∗
(1.11) (0.58) (1.26) (0.30) (0.18) (0.74) (0.71) (0.92) (0.53) (0.78) (1.37)
US 18.52∗∗∗ 5.87∗∗∗ −12.66∗∗∗ 0.31 −0.17 −8.53∗∗∗ −8.38∗∗∗ 2.87∗∗ −0.91 −6.23∗∗∗ −4.27∗
(2.52) (0.82) (2.66) (0.42) (0.18) (1.85) (1.71) (1.15) (0.61) (1.72) (2.49)
Note: The left panel shows the twelve-months-ahead forecast error variance of inflation uncertainty for two sub-samples and the difference
between the two sub-samples based on an FSVAR estimation with one common factor and 12 lags. The middle panel shows the contribution
of the shock size to the changes in column (3). The right panel shows the contribution of changes in the impulse responses to the changes in
column (3). Columns (7) and (11) add up to the total change shown in column (3). The values are multiplied by 100 and bootstrap standard
errors are reported in parentheses.
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flation uncertainty. The total contribution of the propagation mechanism can
be further decomposed into the contribution of the transmission of the interna-
tional shock, spillovers from other countries, and own shocks. Results regarding
the international shock are rather mixed. In France and Germany, the effect of
the international shock becomes weaker whereas the effect becomes significantly
stronger in the US. The propagation mechanism of spillovers remains largely un-
changed as the estimated difference is insignificant in most countries. Finally,
the majority of G7 countries became less sensitive to own shocks. Notably, the
change in the propagation of own shocks accounts for the largest part of the
decline reported in column (11).
The main message from table 2.3 is twofold. First, changes in the propagation
mechanism of shocks to inflation uncertainty have primarily contributed to a
“moderation” in inflation uncertainty. Second, the size of domestic shocks to
inflation uncertainty has decreased in many countries while international shocks
have become slightly larger. Taken together, the international shock has gained
relative importance. Hence, increased synchronization is the result of own shocks
losing importance relative to the international factor.
The above results raise the question of what is so different in the second pe-
riod that led to a stabilization of inflation uncertainty? One policy area that
underwent major changes in the last two decades is the field of monetary pol-
icy. Researchers seem to agree that, in the developed countries, there is now a
better understanding of how to implement monetary policy (see, for instance,
Summers, 2005; Cecchetti et al., 2006). Particularly in the US, monetary policy
moved from an accommodative stance to an inflation-stabilizing policy (see, for
example, Clarida et al., 2000). In a related empirical exercise, Ahmed et al.
(2004) document that most of the decline in inflation volatility in the US may
be explained by better monetary policy. Similarly for the G7, Cecchetti et al.
(2007) argue that the world-wide “Inflation Stabilization” is strongly linked to
central banks acting more responsive to inflationary shocks. Accompanying this
policy shift, there have been a number of institutional changes in monetary policy
in the G7. Major legislative reforms that enhanced central bank independence
were adopted in France, Italy, Japan, and the UK during the nineties. Measured
by different indices of political and economic autonomy, central bank indepen-
dence has generally risen in G7 countries from the first half of our sample to the
second half since 1990 (see Acemoglu et al., 2008; Arnone et al., 2009). Institu-
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tional changes during the last two decades also comprise the announcement of
an inflation target. Among the G7, Canada and the UK introduced an official
inflation target in the early nineties whereas the EMU countries adopted the
ECB’s quantitative target of price stability “below, but close to, 2% over the
medium term”.15 Among others, Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) document
that countries following an inflation targeting strategy successfully improve their
macroeconomic performance by providing a strong nominal anchor. They also
stress that inflation targeting countries are less sensitive to international shocks
by strengthening domestic monetary policy independence. Our results suggest
that the above policy changes not only reduced inflation uncertainty in the last
two decades but also contributed to a stabilization of inflation uncertainty.
2.6 Concluding remarks
Our study provides additional insight into the international linkages of inflation
uncertainty. For this purpose, we use monthly CPI inflation rates in the G7
from 1960 onwards. Our results can be summarized as follows: First, we find ev-
idence of synchronization among inflation uncertainty in the G7. We show that
the degree of synchronization has increased during the most recent two decades.
Second, in an FSVAR framework, we reveal a common shock that moves na-
tional inflation uncertainty in all countries into the same direction. We find that
this common shock is closely related to oil and commodity price uncertainty.
By contrast, a pure US shock induces mixed responses in the G7. Third, based
on recursive estimations, we show that the volatility of inflation uncertainty has
decreased over time, paralleling the process of “Inflation Stabilization”. Fourth,
we document that the propagation mechanism of shocks to inflation uncertainty
in the G7 has changed considerably since 1990. The main channel for the decline
of the volatility of inflation uncertainty seems to be domestic shocks that trans-
late less extensively into the individual economies. This finding supports the
hypothesis of “good policy”. Finally, there appears to be a higher connectedness
of inflation uncertainty among the G7 which is traceable to an increase in the
relative importance of international shocks.
As stressed by Cecchetti et al. (2007), the main candidate for the “Inflation
15Since the beginning of 2012, that is, towards the end of our sample, the US and Japan also
communicate an inflation target.
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Stabilization” in the G7 are changes in the monetary regime. This also provides
a possible explanation for the observed “moderation” in inflation uncertainty.
Although inflation uncertainty is currently rather stable, we should bear in mind
that this appears to be the result of central banks credibly committed to price
stability. Moreover, accepting higher inflation – as recently called for to deal with
the problem of excessive debt – may bring about the additional cost of higher
worldwide inflation uncertainty via spillover effects.
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Appendix
2.A.1 Outlier adjustment
Before the analysis is conducted, we remove a number of outliers in the seasonally
adjusted monthly inflation rates. Table 2.A.1 summarizes the adjustment of
outliers. First, we identified outliers which are traceable to changes in the tax
system; in most cases, we identify an increase in the value-added tax rate. The
outliers in France in 1965:M6 and 1965:M7 are due to one exceptional observation
in the level series of the CPI. Second, following Stock and Watson (2003a), we
refer to an outlier in the data if an observation deviates more than six times
the interquartile range from the local mean. These outliers are marked with an
asterisk in table 2.A.1. All outliers are replaced with the mean of the six adjacent
observations.
Table 2.A.1: Adjustment of outliers in inflation
Canada France Germany
1991:M1 goods and services tax 1965:M6 – 1991:M10 German reunification
1994:M1 arctic outbreak 1965:M7 – 1993:M1 VAT rate from 14% to 15%
1994:M2 severe spending cuts
UK US
1975:M5∗ – 2008:M11∗ –
1979:M7 VAT rate from 8% to 15%
1991:M4 VAT rate from 15% to 17.5%
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2.A.2 Dynamic correlations among country pairs
Figure 2.A.1: Dynamic correlation of inflation uncertainty in the G7 countries
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Note: The shaded area represents business cycle frequencies (8 to 1.5 years). Red lines
report 95% bootstrap confidence intervals. The uncertainty measures were differenced
beforehand. The Bartlett window size is set to 12.
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2.A.3 Testing for changes in correlations among country
pairs
Table 2.A.2: Differences in pairwise correlations of inflation uncertainty
Difference between
1990-2012 and 1960-1989
CND FRA GER ITA JPN UK
FRA 0.41∗∗
(0.19)
GER 0.36∗∗ 0.32∗∗
(0.17) (0.14)
ITA 0.44∗ 0.53∗∗ 0.13
(0.24) (0.22) (0.23)
JPN 0.11 0.16 0.29∗ 0.01
(0.29) (0.24) (0.16) (0.31)
UK 0.62∗∗∗ 0.39∗ −0.03 0.31∗∗ 0.21
(0.15) (0.22) (0.13) (0.16) (0.21)
US 0.48∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.05 0.47∗∗∗ 0.25 0.63∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.17) (0.20) (0.17) (0.19) (0.19)
Note: The entries indicate the difference in correlation between the two sub-samples.
Newey-West standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation up to 12
lags are reported in parentheses. Uncertainty measures were detrended by means of a
bandpass filter which extracts business cycle frequencies (1.5 to 8 years).
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2.A.4 Number of common factors in the FSVAR model
Table 2.A.3: Variance decomposition into international shocks, spillovers, and
domestic shocks
One common factor Two common factors
FE Fraction of FEV due to: FE Fraction of FEV due to:
Horizon STD Int. Spillovers Own STD Int. Int. 1 Int. 2 Spillovers Own
CND 1 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.96 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.96
12 0.25 0.09 0.05 0.86 0.25 0.12 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.84
24 0.86 0.10 0.13 0.76 0.87 0.16 0.13 0.03 0.10 0.74
48 2.87 0.11 0.31 0.59 2.91 0.21 0.19 0.03 0.22 0.56
FRA 1 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.92 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.93
12 0.45 0.16 0.08 0.76 0.46 0.16 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.77
24 1.73 0.19 0.19 0.62 1.73 0.21 0.09 0.11 0.17 0.62
48 5.44 0.22 0.29 0.49 5.44 0.25 0.13 0.13 0.25 0.50
GER 1 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.15 0.03 0.13 0.00 0.85
12 0.28 0.23 0.03 0.74 0.28 0.21 0.05 0.17 0.03 0.75
24 1.06 0.23 0.06 0.71 1.06 0.22 0.05 0.17 0.06 0.72
48 3.59 0.23 0.11 0.66 3.59 0.22 0.05 0.17 0.11 0.67
ITA 1 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.96 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.95
12 0.43 0.07 0.05 0.88 0.43 0.09 0.01 0.08 0.04 0.87
24 1.68 0.10 0.11 0.79 1.68 0.12 0.02 0.10 0.10 0.78
48 5.39 0.14 0.30 0.56 5.39 0.18 0.04 0.14 0.28 0.55
JPN 1 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.96 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.91
12 0.28 0.07 0.04 0.88 0.28 0.12 0.00 0.12 0.05 0.84
24 1.08 0.08 0.09 0.83 1.08 0.12 0.00 0.12 0.09 0.79
48 3.84 0.09 0.13 0.78 3.84 0.13 0.00 0.13 0.13 0.74
UK 1 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.90 0.01 0.13 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.87
12 0.34 0.18 0.08 0.74 0.34 0.21 0.02 0.19 0.08 0.71
24 1.21 0.21 0.22 0.57 1.21 0.25 0.05 0.20 0.20 0.55
48 4.08 0.24 0.44 0.32 4.05 0.30 0.10 0.20 0.38 0.31
US 1 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.94 0.01 0.44 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.56
12 0.52 0.09 0.03 0.88 0.52 0.44 0.44 0.01 0.02 0.53
24 2.01 0.12 0.06 0.83 1.99 0.44 0.42 0.02 0.06 0.50
48 6.28 0.13 0.09 0.78 6.18 0.43 0.40 0.03 0.09 0.48
Note: The table reports the standard deviation (STD) and the variance decomposition of
inflation uncertainty forecast errors at the 1-, 12-, 24-, and 48-months horizon. Fractions
are given as percentage of total forecast error variance (FEV). The estimation is based on
an FSVAR model with 12 lags.
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2.A.5 Financial market uncertainty and the common shock
Figure 2.A.2: Response of financial market uncertainty to the common shock
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90%
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Note: The solid line represents the response of financial market uncertainty to a one-
percent increase in the common shock ft. Financial market uncertainty is the log of the
uncertainty measure in Bloom (2009), who uses the VXO and the VIX from the Chicago
Board Options Exchange to construct a long time series of financial market uncertainty
beginning in 1962:M8. For the estimations in the present paper, we have updated Bloom’s
series until 2012:M4. The 68% and 90% error bands are obtained by a block bootstrap
using a block size of 12 and 20, 000 replications.
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Chapter 3
The process of expectations
formation and the economic
problem “inflation”: Evidence
from the World Economic Survey
3.1 Introduction
In forecast evaluation, a major theme is whether forecasters are rational. In-
formation rigidities provide an explanation for often observed departures from
forecast rationality in survey data.1 Consequently, recent macroeconomic theory
has started to account for informational rigidities based on models of imperfect
information. Two key approaches are related to informational constraints ei-
ther due to delayed (“sticky”) information (Mankiw and Reis, 2002; Reis, 2006)
or partial (“noisy”) information (Woodford, 2001; Sims, 2003; Mac´kowiak and
Wiederholt, 2009).2
This study examines the process of inflation expectations formation in high-
income countries. In particular, we assess the degree of information rigidity in
inflation forecasts following an approach by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010),
which is directly related to models of imperfect information. In contrast to pre-
vious tests of forecast rationality, their approach not only allows testing for the
1See Pesaran and Weale (2006) for an overview of studies testing the rationality of survey
expectations.
2Mankiw and Reis (2010) provide a thorough survey of literature since the last decade.
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presence of informational rigidities but also provides the chance to determine the
economic significance and mechanisms behind departures from forecast rational-
ity.
We use a unique dataset of inflation forecasts for 16 high-income countries
provided by the CESifo World Economic Survey (WES). The WES is conducted
quarterly by the Ifo Institute in Munich in co-operation with the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Paris. To this date, about 1,200 national ex-
perts assess the general economic situation and indicate their expectations on
macroeconomic indicators of their country, including the annual average rate of
inflation. Two advantages arise with WES data. First, they provide fixed-event
inflation forecasts, i.e., a sequence of forecasts related to the same event such
as reported by Consensus Economics and the Survey of Professional Forecast-
ers (SPF). This kind of forecast is well suited to evaluating the incorporation
of new information. Second, the WES polls the experts’ opinion on problems
their economy is facing at present. Thereby, respondents are asked to assess
the importance of a given variety of economic problems such as unemployment,
insufficient demand, public deficits, and inflation. Focusing on the question re-
lated to inflation, we are able to identify periods where this problem is deemed
highly important. This allows us to analyze how changes in the importance of
the problem “inflation” affect the process of forecasting inflation.
Our study is closely linked to literature that relates survey expectations to
models of imperfect information, that is, to both sticky and noisy information,
and that tests for informational rigidities. Andrade and Le Bihan (2010) analyze
individual forecasts provided by the European Survey of Professional Forecasters.
They find evidence of inattentive forecasters with characteristics implied by these
two classes of models. However, their proposed model comprising both charac-
teristics fails to describe the underlying expectations formation process well.
Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010) report informational rigidities in SPF and
Consensus Economics forecasts that point to noisy-information models rather
than models based on sticky information. Also focusing on professional forecast-
ers, Dovern et al. (2013) document a higher degree of information rigidity for the
consensus forecast than for individual forecasts. They infer from the individual
updating frequencies that results are more in accordance with noisy-information
models. Dra¨ger and Lamla (2013) also find support for models of imperfect
information based on consumers’ inflation expectations.
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We contribute to this literature by testing whether inflation expectations can
be characterized by sticky or noisy information. In addition, we address the
more recent question of whether information updating is state-dependent. In
that sense, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010) document that professional fore-
casters exhibit a state-dependent updating behavior in response to changes in
macroeconomic volatility and large visible shocks such as recessions and the
9/11 attacks. Using a panel of advanced and emerging economies, Loungani
et al. (2011) show that the degree of information rigidity declines during reces-
sions and banking crises. Recent contributions by Lamla and Sarferaz (2012)
and Dra¨ger and Lamla (2013) provide evidence on inflation-related news effects
that drive the updating behavior of consumers’ inflation expectations. An im-
portant feature of the present study is that it relies on a cross-country panel
dataset which explicitly allows testing for state-dependence in inflation expec-
tations. Since WES experts indicate the importance of a given set of economic
problems, we are able to investigate whether different “states” concerning the
importance assigned to the economic problem “inflation” influence the formation
of inflation expectations.
Our findings can be summarized in the following way. First, we find evidence
of informational rigidities in inflation forecasts with WES experts updating their
information set every three to four months. However, the degree of information
rigidity crucially depends on the forecast horizon. Second, we document state-
dependence in the process of forecasting inflation. When the majority of WES
experts assess the economic problem “inflation” as being of high importance, the
implied degree of information rigidity is smaller. That is, forecasters are more at-
tentive when inflation concerns are prevailing. The same implication is obtained
when expected trend inflation or past inflation is above a certain threshold. These
empirical findings are supportive of models with noisy information (Woodford,
2001; Sims, 2003; Mac´kowiak and Wiederholt, 2009) and state-dependent updat-
ing of information (Gorodnichenko, 2008; Woodford, 2009).
The remainder of this study is as follows. Section 3.2 illustrates models of
imperfect information and the related test for informational rigidities. Section
3.3 describes the WES dataset and presents descriptive statistics on the inflation
forecasting process. Our findings concerning the test for informational rigidities
using WES inflation forecasts are reported in section 3.4. Consequently, we
discuss the results of testing for state-dependence in the forecasting process in
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section 3.5. Section 3.6 provides conclusions.
3.2 Models of imperfect information
There is a large amount of empirical evidence that full-information rational ex-
pectations are not always given in practice.3 Recent macroeconomic theory in-
corporates imperfect information in the modeling of the expectations formation
process. Two key models are based on either sticky information (Mankiw and
Reis, 2002) or noisy information (Sims, 2003).4 Coibion and Gorodnichenko
(2010) show that these two approaches have common implications concerning
the implied degree of information rigidity and propose a test for the presence of
informational rigidities. In the following, we present a short description of their
test and the underlying models of imperfect information.5
In the sticky-information model, forecasters have rational expectations, yet
they are inattentive and do not update their information set every period (Mankiw
and Reis, 2002; Reis, 2006). Assuming that in each period only a fraction (1−λ)
of forecasters acquire new information, the average forecast Ft can therefore be
expressed as a weighted average of the contemporaneous rational expectations
forecast and the previous period’s average forecast:
Ftπt+h = (1− λ)(πt+h + ut+h,t) + λFt−1πt+h, (3.1)
where h denotes the forecast horizon and ut+h,t is a combination of shocks that
take place from t to t + h representing the rational expectations error. Based
on equation (3.1), the average ex-post forecast error is a function of the average
forecast revision:
πt+h − Ftπt+h =
λ
(1− λ)
(Ftπt+h − Ft−1πt+h) + ut+h,t, (3.2)
where the effect of the forecast revision on the forecast error is directly related to
3Concerning fixed-event forecasts, see, for example, evidence by Nordhaus (1987), Clements
(1997), Isiklar et al. (2006), Clements et al. (2007), Ager et al. (2009), and Dovern and Weisser
(2011).
4Mankiw and Reis (2010) also refer to these two types of models as the delayed and partial
information model, respectively.
5See Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010, 2012) for details and extensions of more general or
specific cases.
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the underlying degree of information rigidity λ. Subsequently, one can infer the
average number of periods between information updates by the formula 1/(1−λ).
Two implications arise from the sticky-information model. First, with λ = 0,
forecasters have perfect information. Second, λ is a constant value which should
hold irrespective of the forecast horizon.
A counterpart to the sticky-information model is based on the assumption
of noisy information (Woodford, 2001; Sims, 2003). Within this framework,
forecasters permanently observe inflation, but only obtain a noisy signal rather
than full information about the true state of inflation. Let each forecaster i
receive an individual signal of inflation:
si,t = πt + ωi,t, (3.3)
where ωi,t ∼ i.i.d. N(0,Σω) is the individual noise of the signal. The forecasters
solve this signal extraction problem by means of the Kalman filter:
Fi,tπt = G (πt + ωi,t) + (1−G)Fi,t−1πt, (3.4)
where G ∈ (0, 1) is the Kalman gain reflecting the relative weight on new infor-
mation. Averaging over forecasters and iterating the expectations forward, the
average ex-post forecast error can be expressed as:
πt+h − Ftπt+h =
1−G
G
(Ftπt+h − Ft−1πt+h) + ut+h,t, (3.5)
where the degree of information rigidity is now given by (1−G). In contrast to
the sticky-information model, the extent to which new information is incorpo-
rated in the noisy-information model depends on the precision of the forecaster’s
underlying signal si,t. As pointed out by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010), the
degree of information rigidity might differ with the strength of the signal and,
thus, across forecast horizons.6
Although equation (3.2) of the sticky-information model and equation (3.5) of
the noisy-information model are based on a different microfoundation, both have
the same implication: in the presence of informational rigidities, the average
6Similarly, the Kalman gain in the noisy-information model is also determined by the per-
sistence of the underlying times series and might consequently differ across macroeconomic
variables.
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ex-post forecast error is predictable by means of the average ex-ante forecast
revision. Note that this implication is obtained by averaging over forecasters and
might not hold at the individual level. Within a regression framework, Coibion
and Gorodnichenko (2010) propose to test for informational rigidities in survey
expectations by regressing the average forecast error on the preceding average
forecast revision. The null of the test states that forecasters have full-information
rational expectations.
3.3 The WES data
We analyze inflation forecasts provided by the CESifo World Economic Survey
(WES). This survey is conducted jointly by the Ifo Institute in Munich and
the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Paris. National experts as-
sess the general economic situation and indicate their expectations with respect
to macroeconomic indicators of their country. Currently, the WES polls about
1,200 experts in 125 countries. Experts are from different institutions such as
international corporations, economic research institutes, chambers of commerce,
embassies, and international organizations. All respondents have a leading posi-
tion in common or are professionally affiliated with economic research.7
The survey is carried out on a quarterly basis during January, April, July,
and October of each year. Previous studies using WES data mainly deal with
qualitative information about experts’ expectations. Henzel and Wollmersha¨user
(2005, 2008), for instance, focus on qualitative WES inflation expectations, that
is, whether most experts expect future inflation to go up, down or remain un-
changed. In the present study, we analyze inflation forecasts based on the single
quantitative question provided by the WES on a quarterly basis. Since 1996:Q1,
participants are asked each quarter of a year:8
Question 4b: The rate of inflation on average
of this year will be % (p.a.)
7See Stangl (2007) for a detailed description of the WES data.
8Before that time, the WES included a question on six-months-ahead inflation since
1990:Q3. However, the wording of this question changed a few times before 1996. See ta-
ble 3.A.1 in the appendix for a detailed description of the survey question on the inflation
rate.
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This question reflects short-term inflation expectations related to a fixed event
where the forecast horizon h declines subsequently with each quarter from h = 4
in January to h = 1 in October of a given year.
Our sample comprises high-income countries classified according to the World
Bank’s annual World Development Report. We restrict our sample to countries
with inflation forecasts consistently available for the period 1996:Q1-2012:Q4 and
with at least four inflation forecasts per period, although the number of forecasts
per country has generally risen towards the end of the sample. Our final dataset
consists of inflation forecasts for 16 high-income economies. Throughout our
analysis, we consider the median inflation forecast as this measure is more robust
to outliers than the mean.
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics of the WES inflation forecasts and real-
ized inflation. Annual CPI inflation was obtained from the OECD database. For
the UK, the inflation rate of the Retail Price Index provided by the UK Office for
National Statistics was taken as the realized target variable until 2004:Q4 since
this data is more closely related to the forecast series (see figure 3.A.1 in the ap-
pendix).9 Note that all countries in our panel are (de facto) inflation targeters.10
On average, there are 19 inflation forecasts per country and per period available.
The number of forecasts varies between 10 (Australia and New Zealand) and 51
forecasts (Germany). The cross-country average of actual inflation is less than
2% and reflects the low inflation rates of these high-income countries during the
most recent two decades. The average forecast error is defined as realized infla-
tion minus the median forecast and is negative in most countries. This suggests
that forecasters have generally overestimated inflation. Yet, the magnitude of
the average forecast error is below 0.2 percentage points in the majority of coun-
tries and is subsequently rather small. The average Root Mean Squared Error
(RMSE) is reported in the last two columns of table 3.1. At the 4-quarter hori-
zon, the smallest RMSE is found in the Netherlands (0.42) whereas the highest
value is present for Sweden (1.17). Unsurprisingly, the RMSE declines with a
reduction in the forecast horizon when more and more information about the
target variable is revealed.
9In the present study, we do not use real-time data on CPI inflation. However, the CPI is
generally subject to fewer and smaller revisions than real variables such as GDP growth (see,
for instance, Giannone et al., 2012, for evidence on the euro area, Japan, and the US).
10Since early 2012, the US and Japan have also been communicating an official inflation
target.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics of WES inflation forecasts and actual inflation
Country
Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg.
# fore- forecast actual forecast RMSE RMSE
casters (median) inflation error (h = 4) (h = 1)
Australia 10 2.9 2.6 −0.24 0.91 0.55
Austria 12 1.8 1.9 0.06 0.73 0.17
Belgium 14 2.0 2.1 0.07 0.75 0.22
Canada 11 2.0 2.0 −0.08 0.48 0.28
Finland 17 1.8 1.7 −0.13 0.82 0.28
France 16 1.7 1.6 −0.12 0.57 0.24
Germany 51 1.7 1.5 −0.16 0.45 0.28
Italy 21 2.3 2.3 −0.01 0.61 0.17
Japan 30 0.1 -0.1 −0.16 0.54 0.30
Netherlands 15 2.2 2.1 −0.05 0.42 0.22
New Zealand 10 2.5 2.3 −0.17 0.69 0.58
Spain 23 2.7 2.7 0.02 0.76 0.24
Sweden 14 1.7 1.2 −0.44 1.17 0.55
Switzerland 14 1.0 0.7 −0.26 0.66 0.20
United Kingdom 17 2.6 2.7 0.13 0.63 0.37
United States 25 2.5 2.4 −0.05 0.69 0.57
Average 19 2.0 1.9 −0.10 0.68 0.33
Note: Sample averages refer to the period 1996:Q1-2012:Q4.
Figure 3.1 shows the size of forecast errors and revisions by different forecast
horizons. On average, the absolute forecast error is the highest in the January
survey of a target year and declines with the forecast horizon. With h = 1, the
size of the forecast error has more than halved. As the calculation of forecast
revisions requires one preceding forecast, the first revision is available in April of
a target year. The size of forecast revisions exhibits a similar downward trend
across horizons, although the difference between subsequent quarters is smaller.
The WES also polls the experts’ opinion on prevailing economic problems in
their country. The wording of the question is:
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Figure 3.1: Size of forecast errors and revisions by forecast horizons
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Question 9: Please try to assess the importance of the following problems
the economy of your country is facing at present:
most important important not so important
- Lack of confidence in the
government’s economic policy   
- Insufficient demand   
- Unemployment   
- Inflation   
- Lack of international competitiveness   
- Trade barriers to exports   
- Lack of skilled labour   
- Public deficits   
- Foreign debts   
- Capital shortage   
To this date, the question concerning current economic problems is posed
bi-annually in the WES questionnaire (April and October of a given year). It
provides three qualitative answers: “most important”, “important”, and “not so
important”. At the country level, the qualitative answers can be summarized
by a balance statistic where the answers “most important” receive a value of 1,
“important” a value of 0 and “not so important” a value of −1. Hence, a balance
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statistic within the range of 0 to 1 indicates that the majority of experts evaluate
the problem as being highly important. In contrast, a balance statistic within the
range of −1 to 0 suggests that the problem is predominantly assessed as being
not so important. Overall, the qualitative question on economic problems allows
for the identification of periods where inflation concerns are prevailing. The
average number of assessments per country ranges between 10 to 54. On average,
each economic problem was evaluated by 20 respondents, which is similar to the
average number of inflation forecasts.11
3.4 Testing the inflation expectations process of
WES forecasters
We examine the process of WES inflation expectations by applying the framework
by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010). To test for the presence of informational
rigidities, we estimate the following equation:
πi,t+h − Ftπi,t+h = β0 + β1∆Ftπi,t+h + νi,h,t, (3.6)
where i denotes the country index, h is the forecast horizon, and νi,h,t represents
the rational expectations error. The forecast revision ∆Ftπi,t+h is the difference
between two subsequent forecasts of current-year inflation (Ftπi,t+h−Ft−1πi,t+h).
In the presence of informational rigidities, β1 is expected to be significantly pos-
itive. In the case of professional forecasters, the revision process might be gov-
erned by strategic behavior due to reputational objectives or forecasting compe-
tition (Marinovic et al., 2013). However, as WES experts are anonymous, the
estimate of β1 should fully reflect the underlying degree of information rigidity.
An alternative test advocated by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010) consists
of regressing the forecast revision on the present and lagged forecast:
πi,t+h − Ftπi,t+h = β0 + γ1Ftπi,t+h + γ2Ft−1πi,t+h + νi,h,t. (3.7)
If the coefficient on the forecast revision in equation (3.6) is positive, this implies
that γ1 > 0, γ2 < 0, and γ1 + γ2 = 0.
11See appendix 3.A.1 for a detailed description of the WES question on economic problems.
Summary statistics of the number of respondents are reported in table 3.A.3 in the appendix.
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For the period 1996-2012, we have a total of 17 forecast events available per
country. Thus, we apply a fixed-effects panel estimator. Given that CPI inflation
is to a large extent driven by energy and commodity prices and therefore includes
a global component, it is reasonable to assume that forecast errors and revisions
are possibly correlated across countries. This might, in turn, violate the central
assumption of the fixed-effects model that innovations are cross-sectionally in-
dependent. Table 3.2 shows the Pesaran (2004) Cross-section Dependence (CD)
test statistic. The hypothesis that residuals of the fixed-effects model are un-
correlated across countries can be rejected at all conventional significance levels.
The average absolute correlation between the innovations amounts to 0.30 at
the longest forecast horizon h = 3. Therefore, we estimate the fixed-effects
model with Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors which are robust to cross-
sectional correlation across countries as well as to heteroskedasticity and auto-
correlation.12
Table 3.2: Testing for cross-sectional independence
h = 1, 2, 3 h = 1 h = 2 h = 3
Pesaran’s CD test statistic 15.10∗∗∗ 4.73∗∗∗ 5.32∗∗∗ 9.10∗∗∗
Average abs. correlation of residuals 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.30
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: Based on a fixed effects (within) estimation of the following model: pii,t+h −
Ftpii,t+h = β0 + β1∆Ftpii,t+h + νi,h,t.
The regression results of the two tests for informational rigidities are reported
in table 3.3. Concerning equation (3.6), the coefficient on the forecast revision
is βˆ1 = 0.12 when pooling across forecast horizons. According to the sticky-
information model, the degree of information rigidity is λ = β1
1+β1
= 0.11. Hence,
the average number of periods between information updates is 1
(1−λ)
= 1.12,
implying that forecasters acquire new information approximately every quarter.
In the context of the noisy-information model, this signifies a weight G = 1
1+β1
=
0.89 on new information relative to the previous forecast. Turning to the separate
12Estimation is based on the Stata modules xtcsd by De Hoyos and Sarafidis (2006) and xtscc
by Hoechle (2006). For all pooled specifications in the present study, outliers were identified
and removed according to Cook’s distance to obtain more precise estimates. Including the
outliers does not change the results in a qualitative way.
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forecast horizons, results differ considerably. At horizons 1 and 2, we do not
find evidence of information rigidity as the coefficient on the forecast revision
is insignificant. That is, the null of full-information rational expectation cannot
be rejected at very short forecast horizons. In contrast, at h = 3, the estimated
coefficient is 0.40 and statistically different from zero at the 1% significance level.
This suggests information updating every four months (1.4 quarters) or a weight
of 0.71 on new information relative to the previous period’s forecast.
The results of regression model (3.7) are displayed in the lower part of table
3.3 and confirm that the forecast horizon does indeed seem to matter. If forecast
errors are pooled across horizons, evidence of the predictions implied by models
of informational rigidities is found neither by the sign of the coefficients nor by
statistical significance. At the shortest horizon h = 1, the signs of the coefficients
on the current and past forecast would be inconsistent with predictions from the
sticky- or noisy-information model. Only at h = 3 do both coefficients have the
expected sign and are statistically significant. Additionally, the null that both
coefficients add up to zero cannot be rejected at the 10% level. Overall, we only
find support for models of imperfect information at a longer forecast horizon.
Taken together, the message from table 3.3 is twofold. First, we find evidence
of a moderate degree of information rigidity in inflation forecasts of three to
four months. This updating frequency is higher than found by Coibion and
Gorodnichenko (2010) for the US (six to seven months). However, the authors
report a smaller degree of information rigidity when using cross-country data
and notably when results are solely based on Consensus Economics inflation
forecasts. Moreover, evidence on micro price changes also suggests an average
updating frequency of about one quarter (Klenow and Malin, 2010).
Second, we find that the degree of information rigidity in WES inflation fore-
casts differs across forecast horizons. As laid out in section 3.2, this is in contrast
to the prediction of the sticky-information model where λ should hold irrespective
of the time distance to the forecasting variable. Divergent results across fore-
cast horizons are rather supportive of noisy-information models (Coibion and
Gorodnichenko, 2010). Given that WES experts forecast the annual average
rate of inflation, they have little information available at the January survey of
a given year. With the end of the target year approaching, they obtain increas-
ingly more information to predict annual average inflation. In the context of the
noisy-information model, this implies that the forecasters’ signal about the true
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state of annual average inflation is revealed more precisely with each subsequent
quarter of a target year. Conversely, the degree of information rigidity increases
with the forecast horizon of a target year. This feature of noisy-information
models is reflected by WES forecasts. A higher degree of information rigidity
at longer forecast horizons is also documented for Consensus Economics survey
data which consists in year-on-year growth rates or annual average growth rates
(Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2010; Loungani et al., 2011).
Table 3.3: Testing for the presence of informational rigidities
Dependent variable: h = 1, 2, 3 h = 1 h = 2 h = 3
πt+h − Ftπt+h (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Ftπt+h 0.12
∗∗ −0.10 0.05 0.40∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.11)
R-squared 0.18 0.30 0.19 0.20
# observations 768 260 260 256
Ftπt+h 0.08 −0.14
∗∗ 0.01 0.40∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.11)
Ft−1πt+h 0.00 0.22
∗∗∗ 0.09 −0.28∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.07) (0.10) (0.09)
p-value (γ1 + γ2 = 0) 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.10
R-squared 0.20 0.37 0.21 0.21
# observations 766 260 261 257
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in parentheses. Each specification includes
country-fixed effects. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
In general, our sample period is characterized by lower macroeconomic volatil-
ity in light of the “Great Moderation” and by the introduction of (de facto) in-
flation targeting in most countries. Therefore, it is also of interest to see whether
the degree of information rigidity was rather stable or changing during the pe-
riod 1996-2012. Recent contributions emphasize that the degree of inattention in
inflation expectations is time-varying (Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2010; Lamla
and Sarferaz, 2012; Dra¨ger and Lamla, 2012). We follow the former and esti-
mate equation (3.6) for each point in time by Pooled Ordinary Least Squares.
The smoothed coefficient β1,t is shown in figure 3.2. Evidently, the underlying
degree of information rigidity is not constant over time. The coefficient on the
forecast revision is on average higher during the first half of the sample with a
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significant increase during the mid-2000s. It exhibits a sharp significant drop
during the recent Global Financial Crisis. Note that our estimation is based on
a rather small sample resulting in a higher parameter uncertainty. Nevertheless,
figure 3.2 suggests that there are changes in the underlying degree of information
rigidity. Notably, the extent to which forecasters are inattentive might change
with the economic stance.
Figure 3.2: Time-varying estimate of information rigidity
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Note: The figure shows the coefficient on the forecast revision based on a Gaussian kernel
smoother with a bandwidth of three quarters (solid line) together with ±1 standard error
(dashed lines).
3.5 Testing for state-dependence in inflation ex-
pectations
The previous section showed that the degree of information rigidity in WES infla-
tion forecasts varies over time. Consequently, we address the question of whether
the degree of inattention is subject to changes over the course of the economy.
State-dependence in the expectations formation process has also been empha-
sized by recent empirical studies (Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2010; Loungani
et al., 2011; Lamla and Sarferaz, 2012). In the context of imperfect information
models, it can be optimal for agents to be inattentive given lower macroeconomic
volatility or to focus more on idiosyncratic rather than aggregate conditions
87
(Sims, 2003; Branch et al., 2009; Mac´kowiak and Wiederholt, 2009). Likewise,
recent contributions combine state-dependent characteristics of updating or pric-
ing behavior with informational rigidities (Gorodnichenko, 2008; Knotek, 2010;
Woodford, 2009).13 In this section, we analyze whether the degree of informa-
tion rigidity in inflation forecasts is subject to economic conditions. We consider
two approaches. First, we investigate whether the degree of information rigidity
varies when the economic problem “inflation” is assessed as being highly im-
portant by WES experts. Second, we analyze in this vein whether forecasters
are more attentive when realized inflation is above a certain threshold. In our
application, both approaches suggest that the degree of information rigidity is
state-dependent.
3.5.1 Subjective assessment of the economic problem “in-
flation”
The WES asks participants to evaluate the importance of a given choice of
economic problems. Consequently, we are able to investigate whether differ-
ent “states” of the importance assigned to the problem “inflation” influence
the expectations formation process. Figure 3.3 shows the balance statistic of
the problem “inflation” (left axis) together with annual average inflation (right
axis). The balance statistic ranges between −1 and 1 whereas actual inflation is
centered roughly around its mean value. The latter is not known before January
of the following year whereas the last forecast is made in October of a given
year. Although the balance statistic has predominantly remained negative, there
are periods where the economic problem “inflation” is more prevailing. In these
periods, the respective balance statistic is close to zero (“important”) or even
positive (“most important”). This increase in the balance statistic is generally
accompanied by an increase in inflation. Both variables are strongly linked with
a correlation coefficient of 0.66. That is, the balance statistic is a good predictor
of whether annual average inflation will be (subjectively) high. An increase in
the balance statistic can be observed in most countries during the early 2000s,
the oil price hike in 2008 and in the aftermath of the Great Recession with a
pickup of inflation rates in 2011. The lowest maximum balance statistic over
time is found in Japan (−0.32), which reflects the prolonged deflation era of this
13See Mankiw and Reis (2010), chapter 7.1, for an overview of this strand of literature.
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country. In Spain, experts generally assigned a high importance to the problem
of inflation from the end of the 1990s onwards until 2008. During this period,
Spain also experienced on average the highest inflation rate of all countries in
our sample.
Alternatively, we can assess to which extent WES experts perceive the prob-
lem “inflation” as being important in comparison to other economic problems
mentioned in the questionnaire. To obtain a ranking of economic problems, the
balance statistics of the ten given economic problems are sorted from the highest
to lowest value for each country and period. Accordingly, a rank of 1 indicates
the highest rank possible, and 10 the lowest. Figure 3.4 displays the rank of the
economic problem “inflation” over time. The co-movement with actual inflation
is inverse to the previous figure. Peaks of annual average inflation generally co-
incide with a high ranking of the economic problem “inflation” and thus a low
value of the rank. The ranking exhibits a strong negative correlation with actual
inflation and the balance statistic shown in figure 3.3; the correlation coefficient
is −0.55 and −0.82, respectively. Overall, the rank of the problem “inflation” is
on average not ranked highest of the ten economic problems. This is similar to
findings by Ehrmann and Tzamourani (2012). Using data from the World Values
Survey for 23 industrialized countries, the authors document that respondents do
not assign the highest importance to “fighting rising prices” from a given choice
of policy priorities. Nevertheless, the ranking of the economic problem “infla-
tion” presented here is far from being time-invariant, as it indicates periods with
higher inflation concerns. Given that the WES survey provides a direct measures
of the (subjective) importance of inflation, one would expect that forecasters are
more attentive during these periods.
In the following, we test for state-dependence in WES inflation expectations
by augmenting the test for informational rigidities in section 3.4 with interaction
variables referring to states when inflation is deemed highly important. A similar
approach is conducted by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010) and Loungani et al.
(2011). Since our regression results in section 3.4 revealed that informational
rigidities are mainly prevailing at the longest forecast horizon, we perform the
subsequent analysis at h = 3 only and estimate the following equation:14
πt+3 − Ftπt+3 = β0 + β1∆Ftπt+3 + β2D
Pr.π
t + β3∆Ftπt+3 ×D
Pr.π
t + νt, (3.8)
14To simplify the notation, we drop the country subscript from the subsequent equations.
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Figure 3.3: Importance of the economic problem “inflation” and actual inflation
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Note: This figure shows the WES balance statistic of the economic problem “inflation”
(bar chart, left axis) together with annual average inflation (black line, right axis) of a
respective year. In calculating the balance statistic, answers indicating “most important”
receive a value of 1, “important” a value of 0 and “not so important” a value of −1.
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Figure 3.4: Rank of the economic problem “inflation” and actual inflation
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Note: This figure shows the WES ranking of the economic problem “inflation” (bar chart,
left axis) together with annual average inflation (solid line, right axis) of a respective year.
The rank is ranging from 1 (highest value of the balance statistic out of 10 given economic
problems) to 10 (lowest value).
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where DPr.πt is an indicator variable for periods when the economic problem “in-
flation” is predominantly assessed as being highly important. We consider three
alternative indicators. First, the indicator DPr.πt equals one when the balance
statistic of the problem “inflation” is positive; otherwise, the indicator equals
zero. Second, we consider an alternative balance statistic where both the answers
“most important” and “important” receive a value of 1 and “not so important”
a value of 0. Based on this alternative balance statistic, we then define a con-
tinuous indicator DPr.πt which varies between 0 and 1. Third, we focus on the
rank of inflation among the ten possible economic problems. In particular, DPr.πt
equals one when inflation is among the three most important economic problems
during this period, and zero otherwise. In all cases, β3 reflects the difference in
the effect of the forecast revision (that is, the underlying degree of information
rigidity) in periods of a subjective higher importance of inflation in contrast to
periods where this problem is not as prevailing. In case of full-information ra-
tional expectations, the sum of the coefficient on the forecast revision and the
interaction with the indicator variable should equal zero.
Regression results are summarized in table 3.4. The first regression model is
based on the indicator equal to one when the majority of experts evaluate the
problem “inflation” as highly important. The coefficient on the interaction term
between the indicator variable and the forecast revision is significantly negative.
Thus, the degree of information rigidity is lower when inflation concerns are pre-
vailing. Regression (2) displays the specification based on the alternative balance
statistic. We also find a significantly negative interaction term between the indi-
cator variable and the forecast revision. When the fraction of experts indicating
“most important” or “important” increases, the associated degree of information
rigidity in inflation forecasts is lower. A similar result is obtained with regression
(3). When inflation is among the top 3 economic problems as given in the WES
questionnaire, the degree of inattention declines. The Wald test on whether both
coefficients related to the forecast revision add up to zero is displayed in the lower
part of table 3.4. In regressions (2) and (3), we cannot reject the null hypoth-
esis that forecasters have full-information rational expectations. In the case of
regression (1), the null that β1 and β3 are equal in magnitude can be rejected at
all conventional significance levels. Given that the estimated coefficient on the
interaction term is absolutely larger than the coefficient on the forecast revision,
this finding does not suggest a departure from full-information rational expecta-
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tions but rather overshooting expectations concerning future inflation (Coibion
and Gorodnichenko, 2010). Note that the coefficient on all indicator variables is
positive and significant at the 1% level. This implies that the forecast error is sig-
nificantly different in periods of a higher importance of inflation than in periods
when this economic problem is not as prevailing. However, a constant term of a
specific event is not informative about departures from full-information rational
expectations. Rather, it indicates whether all forecasts made within this event
have the same bias (Bakhshi et al., 2005). Here, in times of a higher importance
of the problem inflation, forecast errors generally have an upward bias. Taken
together, the above findings point to state-dependence in the forecasting process
with information being acquired and processed more quickly when the economic
problem “inflation” is highly important.
Table 3.4: Testing for state-dependence in inflation expectations given the im-
portance of the economic problem “inflation”
Dependent variable: Balance statistic Alt. balance statistic Rank of problem
πt+3 − Ftπt+3
of problem “inflation” > 0 of problem “inflation” ∈ [0, 1] “inflation” ≤ 3 (out of 10)
(1) (2) (3)
∆Ftπt+3 0.47
∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08)
DPr.πt 0.38
∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.16) (0.10)
∆Ftπt+3 ×D
Pr.π
t −0.67
∗∗∗ −0.55∗∗∗ −0.56∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.17) (0.15)
p-value (β1 + β3 = 0) 0.00 0.39 0.32
R-squared 0.26 0.28 0.31
# observations 257 258 258
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in parentheses. Each specification includes country-fixed effects.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Likewise, large changes in the subjective importance of inflation might have
an effect on the degree of information rigidity. To this end, we estimate the
following model:
πt+3 − Ftπt+3 = β0 + β1∆Ftπt+3 + β2D
∆Pr.π
t + β3∆Ftπt+3 ×D
∆Pr.π
t + νt, (3.9)
where D∆Pr.πt equals one in case of large changes in the balance statistic of the
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economic problem “inflation” and zero otherwise. Large changes are defined as
being in the upper 90th percentile of the non-negative distribution of changes.
Thereby, we consider both the balance statistic (ranging between −1 and 1) and
the alternative balance statistic (ranging between 0 and 1). Estimation results
are reported in table 3.5. Regression (1) comprises the indicator based on changes
in the balance statistic. The related interaction term with the forecast revision is
significantly negative and larger in magnitude than the coefficient on the forecast
revision. Once more, forecasters seem to have overshooting expectations; the null
that both coefficients add up to zero is rejected at the 1% level. A significantly
lower degree of information rigidity is also found when the analysis is based on the
alternative balance statistic. Here, we cannot reject the null that the coefficients
are equal in absolute value. In both specifications, the intercept of the indicator
variable is again significantly different from periods with no large changes in the
importance of inflation. Our findings suggest that information updating speeds
up when the economic problem “inflation” has gained importance. This confirms
state-dependent behavior in inflation forecasting.
Table 3.5: Testing for state-dependence in inflation expectations given changes
in the importance of the economic problem “inflation”
Dependent variable: Change in balance stat. Change in alt. balance stat.
πt+3 − Ftπt+3
of problem “inflation” of problem “inflation”
(1) (2)
∆Ftπt+3 0.37
∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11)
D∆Pr.πt 0.55
∗∗∗ 0.42∗
(0.12) (0.21)
∆Ftπt+3 ×D
∆Pr.π
t −0.85
∗∗∗ −0.72∗∗
(0.13) (0.27)
p-value (β1 + β3 = 0) 0.00 0.22
R-squared 0.22 0.20
# observations 242 243
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in parentheses. Each specification includes country-fixed effects.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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3.5.2 Level of expected trend inflation and past inflation
As documented in the previous section, forecasters are on average more attentive
during periods of a higher importance of the economic problem “inflation”. In
a similar vein, we would expect a lower degree of information rigidity when the
level of inflation is high. Most countries in our sample can be seen as (de facto)
inflation targeters with generally an announced band of inflation within the range
1-3% (Roger, 2010). This raises the question of whether the degree of inattention
changes when inflation is higher than the announced target. For this purpose,
we define high-inflation states by means of two alternative measures. First, we
derive a measure of trend inflation from an Unobserved Components-Stochastic
Volatility (UC-SV) model. The estimation is performed recursively with data
from 1991:Q1 onwards through each forecast quarter t. This yields a one-sided
estimate of the trend component of inflation, which can be seen as a measure
of long-term inflation expectations (Stock and Watson, 2010). Second, we also
compare past levels of the annualized quarterly rate of inflation.15 Since the
WES is queried within January, April, July, and October of a given year, we
assume that the previous quarter’s (trend) inflation is in the information set of
WES experts.
As before, we test for state-dependence by augmenting equation (3.6) with
indicator variables for high-inflation states:
πt+3 − Ftπt+3 = β0 + β1∆Ftπt+3 + β2D
HI
t + β3∆Ftπt+3 ×D
HI
t + νt, (3.10)
where DHIt equals one during periods when (trend) inflation is above a certain
threshold value and zero otherwise.
Table 3.6 reports the regression results concerning the different threshold val-
ues of inflation. Regressions (1) to (3) are based on trend inflation. Whenever
this measure is above a threshold of 2.5 percentage points, the implied degree
of information rigidity is significantly smaller. This effect is amplified when the
threshold value is set to 3 percentage points or to the 90th percentile of the
distribution of inflation rates, as indicated by the increasing magnitude of the
coefficient on the interaction term. In all cases, we cannot reject the null that
the sum of coefficients is zero. Regressions (4) to (6) are related to the annu-
15See appendix 3.A.4 for a description of inflation data and the estimation of the UC-SV
model.
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alized quarterly rate of inflation. When the value of past inflation is above 2.5
percentage points, we do not document a significant change in the expectations
formation process. In contrast, there is a significant decrease in the underlying
degree of information rigidity for states with inflation above a value of 3 percent-
age points or within the 90th percentile. Concerning the Wald test displayed in
the lower part of table 3.6, there is again evidence of full-information rational ex-
pectations or overshooting expectations. The results based on threshold values of
expected trend inflation and past inflation emphasize our previous findings that
state-dependence is inherent in the process of inflation expectations formation.
Table 3.6: Testing for state-dependence in inflation expectations given the level
of actual inflation
Dependent variable: Trend inflation Trend inflation Trend inflation QoQ inflation QoQ inflation QoQ inflation
πt+3 − Ftπt+3
> 2.5 > 3 ∈ 90th percentile > 2.5 > 3 ∈ 90th percentile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆Ftπt+3 0.48
∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.30∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.14) (0.09) (0.09)
DHIt 0.39
∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.18)
∆Ftπt+3 ×D
HI
t −0.44
∗∗∗ −0.63∗∗∗ −0.66∗∗∗ −0.31 −0.62∗∗∗ −0.96∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.19) (0.12) (0.19) (0.15) (0.24)
p-value (β1 + β3 = 0) 0.80 0.43 0.18 0.91 0.12 0.03
R-squared 0.30 0.28 0.26 0.30 0.30 0.29
# observations 255 256 256 258 259 258
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in parentheses. Each specification includes country-fixed effects.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
3.6 Concluding remarks
The focus of this paper was to analyze the process of inflation expectations
formation in high-income countries. Specifically, we assess the degree of in-
formation rigidity in inflation forecasts following an approach by Coibion and
Gorodnichenko (2010). Their test is directly based on models of imperfect in-
formation and allows for the inference of the economic significance as well as
the underlying mechanisms of a departure from full-information rational expec-
tations. We apply their approach to a unique dataset provided by the CESifo
World Economic Survey. Our sample comprises inflation forecasts for 16 high-
income countries from 1996 to 2012. Since WES participants are also asked to
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evaluate the importance of the economic problem “inflation”, we can identify
periods where inflation concerns are prevailing. Consequently, we analyze to
what extent the level and changes in the importance of the problem “inflation”
influence the underlying expectations formation process.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, we provide evidence
of information rigidity with WES experts updating their information set every
three to four months. However, the degree of information rigidity crucially de-
pends on the forecast horizon. Second, we document state-dependence in the
process of forecasting inflation. When the majority of WES experts assess the
economic problem “inflation” as being highly important, the implied degree of
information rigidity is lower. We actually find that forecasters can be charac-
terized by having full-information rational expectations during times of higher
inflation concerns. This conclusion seems robust when considering the level of
expected and past inflation. Whenever the value of expected trend inflation or
past quarterly inflation is above a critical threshold, forecasters are on average
more attentive.
For economic modeling, two implications arise from our empirical findings.
Since the degree of information rigidity varies across forecast horizons, this val-
idates noisy-information models (Woodford, 2001; Sims, 2003; Mac´kowiak and
Wiederholt, 2009) rather than sticky-information models which assume a con-
stant updating frequency. A more prominent role of noisy information in forecast-
ers’ expectations formation process is also consistent with findings by Coibion and
Gorodnichenko (2010) and Dovern et al. (2013). Moreover, we document that the
degree of information rigidity varies with the importance attached to the forecast-
ing variable inflation. This finding suggests a state-dependent rule of information
updating, as recently addressed in theoretical models by Gorodnichenko (2008)
and Woodford (2009).
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Appendix
3.A.1 Wording of WES questions
Table 3.A.1: Wording of WES question on inflation rate
from 07/1990 to 04/1991 (except in 10/1990)
The rate of inflation will be: %∗
from 07/1991 to 07/1994 and in 04/1995
The rate of inflation by the end of the next 6 months will be: % (p.a.)
from 10/1994 to present (except in 04/1995)
The rate of inflation on average of this year will be: % (p.a.)∗∗
∗ Expected tendency of consumer prices within the next 6 to 12 months.
∗∗ The remark “(compared to average of previous year)” was used from 10/1994 to 10/1998,
in 10/1999 and 10/2000. The number of the year was used instead of “this year” in every
January survey of each year from 2002 onwards, as well as in all 2004 surveys, 10/2005,
07/2006, 10/2006, and from 07/2011 onwards.
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Table 3.A.2: Wording of WES question on economic problems
from 03/1983 to 04/1991
The most important problems for the economy in this country are at present:
- Inflation 
from 07/1991 to 10/2003
Please try to assess the importance of the following problems the economy
of your country is facing at present:
most important also very important not so important/
not relevant∗
- Inflation   
from 04/2004 to present
Please try to assess the importance of the following problems the economy
of your country is facing at present:
most important important not so important
- Inflation   
∗ The word “so” was omitted in 04/1998 and 07/1998; “not relevant” was omitted in
04/2002, 10/2002, and 10/2003.
In 04/2003, “very important” was used instead of “most important” and “important” was
used instead of “also very important”.
The questions were included in the WES with a periodicity as follows. In 1983: March,
August. From 1984 to 1988: March, June, October. From 1989 to 01/2002: January,
April, July, October. From 04/2002 to present: April, October.
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3.A.2 Comparison of UK WES forecasts to CPI and RPI
inflation
Figure 3.A.1: Comparison of UK WES forecasts to CPI and RPI inflation
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3.A.3 Descriptive statistics on economic problems
Table 3.A.3: Average number of assessments per economic problem
Country Pr. 01 Pr. 02 Pr. 03 Pr. 04 Pr. 05 Pr. 06 Pr. 07 Pr. 08 Pr. 09 Pr. 10
Australia 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Austria 13 13 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
Belgium 15 15 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 15
Canada 11 11 11 12 11 11 12 11 11 11
Finland 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
France 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
Germany 54 53 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 53
Italy 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Japan 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 31
Netherlands 16 16 16 16 15 15 16 16 16 15
New Zealand 10 10 10 10 10 11 10 10 10 10
Spain 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 24
Sweden 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 14
Switzerland 13 14 13 13 13 13 14 13 13 13
United Kingdom 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
United States 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
Average 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Note: Sample average is referring to questionnaires conducted in April and October of
a respective year (1996:Q2-2012:Q4). Legend: Pr. 01: Lack of confidence in the gov-
ernment’s economic policy. Pr. 02: Insufficient demand. Pr. 03: Unemployment. Pr.
04: Inflation. Pr. 05: Lack of international competitiveness. Pr. 06: Trade barriers to
exports. Pr. 07: Lack of skilled labour. Pr. 08: Public deficits. Pr. 09: Foreign debts.
Pr. 10: Capital shortage.
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3.A.4 Description of inflation data and the UC-SV model
Inflation is measured as the annualized quarterly percent change in the Consumer
Price Index (CPI) as given by 400×log(CPIt/CPIt−1). For the UK, the inflation
rate of the Retail Price Index is taken until 2004:Q4 and the inflation rate of the
CPI thereafter. All inflation series are seasonally adjusted. Moreover, we tracked
and replaced outliers in the data beforehand as reported in table 3.A.4. Thereby,
we detect observations that deviate more than a certain threshold (here, four)
times the interquartile range from the median (Stock and Watson, 2003a). These
outliers are marked with an asterisk in table 3.A.4 and were replaced with the
median over a symmetric window of six observations. Furthermore, we replaced
five outliers either due to major VAT rate changes (in Japan, the Netherlands,
and Sweden) or exceptional observations such as the German reunification in
1991.
Table 3.A.4: Detection of outliers in quarterly CPI inflation rate
Country Dates of replaced outliers
Australia 2000:Q3∗
Canada 1991:Q1∗
Germany 1991:Q3 1991:Q4 1993:Q1∗
Japan 1997:Q2
Netherlands 2001:Q1
New Zealand 2010:Q4∗
Sweden 1991:Q1∗ 1992:Q1 1993:Q1∗
United States 2008:Q4∗
To measure trend inflation, we estimate an unobserved components model
with stochastic volatility (UC-SV) as proposed by Stock and Watson (2007).
The underlying state-space model decomposes inflation into a stochastic trend
and a transitory component. The UC-SV model is defined as:
πt = π¯t + ηt ηt ∼ N(0, σ
2
η,t) (3.A.1)
π¯t+1 = π¯t + ǫt ǫt ∼ N(0, σ
2
ǫ,t) (3.A.2)
log σ2η,t+1 = log σ
2
η,t + ν1,t (3.A.3)
log σ2ǫ,t+1 = log σ
2
ǫ,t + ν2,t (3.A.4)(
ν1,t
ν2,t
)
∼ N(0, γI2) (3.A.5)
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The trend component is denoted by π¯t whereas the transitory component is
modeled as the innovation process ηt. The variances of the trend and transitory
innovations are allowed to vary over time by following a geometric random walk.
This, in turn, leads to a time-varying estimate of trend inflation. The model
includes only one scalar parameter γ which affects the time variation of the
shock variances. Following Stock and Watson (2007), we compute the UC-SV
model with γ = 0.20 for quarterly inflation. Estimation is carried out with the
Gibbs sampler.
For the purpose of our analysis, we want to obtain a real-time measure of trend
inflation. To this end, estimation of the UC-SV model is performed recursively
with the same starting point in 1991:Q1 for all countries and an increasing data
window from 1996:Q1 through 2012:Q4. Using only inflation data available up
to t yields a one-sided estimate of the trend component of inflation π¯t|t. Note
that, according to equation (3.A.1), the model’s unbiased forecast of inflation
is the trend component of inflation, irrespective of the forecast horizon. As
suggested by Stock and Watson (2010), the estimate of π¯t|t provides a proxy of
long-term inflation expectations at time t. Figure 3.A.2 displays the resulting
trend measure together with the annualized quarterly rate of inflation.
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Figure 3.A.2: Recursive estimates of the trend component of inflation
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Note: The gray line represents actual annualized quarterly inflation. The dark line repre-
sents the estimate of trend inflation.
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